If australia is only marginanlly ahead of nz in long term survival, is moving to australia still necessary? id rather stay in nz for nuclear war without the drawbacks
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Executive summary
A comparative study in Risk Analysis ranked Australia first and New Zealand second among island nations for surviving an “abrupt sunlight‑reducing catastrophe” such as nuclear winter, principally on food, energy and manufacturing capacity [1] [2]. That margin is real but qualified: Australia’s higher aggregate capacity is offset by greater strategic risk from close military ties, while New Zealand’s relative safety rests on remoteness and a nuclear‑free policy—so relocation is a tradeoff, not a clear imperative [1] [2] [3].
1. The study and what “marginally ahead” actually measures
Researchers compared 38 island countries across 13 factors and concluded Australia “performed best overall” with New Zealand close behind because both can produce enough food and have energy resilience to avoid pre‑industrial collapse after a severe sunlight‑reducing event [1] [2]. The metrics are prospective and relative: they model capacity to sustain populations and reboot civilisation, not absolute safety or immunity from other post‑catastrophe dangers [1] [2].
2. Strategic vulnerability: why Australia’s lead isn’t only about farms and fuel
The same papers flag Australia's geopolitical ties to the US and UK as a major factor that could make it a target in a nuclear exchange, eroding its technical advantages if conflict dynamics select for allied states [1] [2] [3]. Conversely, New Zealand’s long‑standing nuclear‑free stance and relative isolation are repeatedly cited as protective factors in expert commentary, which complicates the simple “bigger = safer” narrative [1] [2].
3. Practical survival advantages — and overlooked logistical bottlenecks
Models and expert commentary emphasise that the Antipodes’ agricultural productivity and oceanic buffer mean they could still grow crops when much of the northern hemisphere cannot, making them “exceptions” in food security projections [4] [3]. Yet analysts warn that producing food doesn’t equal distributing it: fuel dependence, transport networks and urban supply chains could break, undermining the theoretical surplus without resilient logistics and governance to move food to people [4] [5].
4. Social and political risks in a post‑catastrophe world
Reporting and think‑tank analyses stress secondary risks: refugee pressures, governance collapse, and the possibility of external actors seeking resources — scenarios ranging from managed alliances with neighbours to darker outcomes like coercion or enslavement described in some commentaries [5] [6]. Experts explicitly caution that models cannot capture all variables in complex social systems, so survivability is contingent on pre‑existing resilience measures and political choices [5] [6].
5. Uncertainty in expert claims and the limits of “last places standing” rhetoric
Prominent voices such as investigative journalist Annie Jacobsen and several journalists have argued that Australia and New Zealand might be among the few places capable of sustaining large populations, but these are scenario‑based arguments, not deterministic forecasts, and authors stress profound uncertainty [7] [8] [9]. Media coverage amplifies the idea of the Antipodes as havens, but the underlying research authors and other analysts call for caution and policy planning rather than complacency [1] [2].
6. Bottom line — is moving from New Zealand to Australia “necessary”?
If Australia’s advantage over New Zealand is marginal in the published models, moving is not strictly necessary; staying in New Zealand is a defensible choice because the country ranks near the top for agricultural and climatic resilience and benefits from lower target likelihood [1] [2] [3]. However, “not necessary” is not the same as “risk‑free”: the long‑run survivability of either country depends on maintaining food distribution networks, energy systems, population policies, and diplomatic posture, and on contingency planning to handle refugees and governance stress [4] [5]. The correct personal or policy decision therefore hinges on tolerance for uncertain systemic risks, preparedness to address logistical and social fragilities, and whether one prioritises marginal increases in capacity (Australia) versus marginally lower geopolitical targeting risk (New Zealand) as informed by the research and expert commentary [1] [2] [3] [4].