What alternative definitions of antisemitism exist and how do they treat criticism of Israel or Zionism?
Executive summary
Two broad fault lines run through contemporary definitions of antisemitism: one, exemplified by the IHRA working definition and allied tests, explicitly treats certain delegitimizing and demonizing critiques of Israel as antisemitic; the other, represented by scholar-led alternatives like the Jerusalem Declaration and Nexus/“JDA” formulations, narrows the category to protect robust political criticism and ties antisemitism more tightly to classic anti‑Jewish tropes [1] [2]. Debates over these definitions are not just semantic—advocates on each side say their approach best protects Jewish people from real threats while critics warn the other side’s wording can be weaponized to silence political dissent or to excuse anti‑Jewish hate [3] [2].
1. IHRA: a widely adopted working definition that flags some Israel-related language
The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition—adopted by many governments and cited by the U.S. State Department—frames antisemitism as hostility toward Jews and includes illustrative examples that treat “denying the Jewish people their right to self‑determination” and applying double standards to Israel as antisemitic, while also saying ordinary criticism of Israel similar to that leveled at other countries is not antisemitic [1] [4]. Proponents argue the list of examples helps identify when political rhetoric masks long‑standing antisemitic tropes, a claim repeated by organizations such as the ADL and AJC [5] [6].
2. The “Three Ds” and tests that try to separate criticism from prejudice
Before IHRA’s broad uptake, Natan Sharansky’s “three Ds” — delegitimization, demonization and double standards — were offered as a practical litmus test to distinguish legitimate policy critique from antisemitism, and elements of that logic influenced later documents and enforcement guidance [7]. Civil‑society defenders say tools like the three Ds or IHRA examples help identify when anti‑Israel rhetoric crosses into classic antisemitic canards (dual‑loyalty, conspiratorial control, Holocaust inversion) and therefore should be treated as hate, not mere policy debate [5] [8].
3. Alternatives: Jerusalem Declaration (JDA), Nexus, and white‑paper approaches
Scholars and some Jewish groups have countered with alternative formulations — notably the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism and the Nexus Document/white paper from academic task forces — that were explicitly designed to carve out protection for vigorous criticism of Israel and to reduce the risk of censoring political speech; these documents emphasize antisemitism’s historical tropes and call for clearer limits on labeling anti‑Zionist or anti‑Israel speech as antisemitic unless it actually invokes anti‑Jewish ideas [2] [9]. Supporters of these alternatives argue that IHRA’s illustrative examples are vague enough to be deployed politically to silence human‑rights advocates, a concern advanced in critical reporting [2] [4].
4. How each treats criticism of Israel and anti‑Zionism
IHRA and allied groups treat attacks that deny Israel’s right to exist, apply unique double standards, or borrow classic antisemitic images against Israel as antisemitic, while asserting that ordinary criticism of policy is legitimate [1] [4]. ADL and mainstream Jewish organizations extend this to say anti‑Zionism that delegitimizes Jewish nationhood often traffics in antisemitic tropes [5] [6]. By contrast, the JDA/Nexus approach intentionally leaves room for non‑antisemitic anti‑Zionism and for sharp criticism of Israeli policy, warning that overbroad definitions risk chilling speech and conflating Jews with the state [2] [9].
5. Politics, weaponization, and real‑world consequences
Critics on both sides say the other camp’s motives color its drafting: some pro‑Israel groups deploy IHRA examples to push institutions to punish campus protest or journalism they dislike, while critics of IHRA argue scholar‑led alternatives sometimes underplay ways anti‑Israel rhetoric overlaps with anti‑Jewish hate [2] [3]. Empirical claims — for example, whether IHRA has actually chilled debate on campuses — are contested: proponents deny measurable chilling effects and point to continued vigorous Israel criticism among activists, while opponents cite cases where IHRA language has been invoked in disciplinary or political campaigns [3] [2].
6. Bottom line: two competing logics, one pragmatic dilemma
The practical choice between definitions is not purely technical: it reflects whether priority is given to broad tools for identifying contemporary antisemitism linked to Israel (the IHRA/3D logic) or to strict free‑speech protections for political critique (the JDA/Nexus logic); the evidence shows both protections and risks exist, and scholarly and advocacy communities remain sharply divided about where the line should fall [1] [2] [9]. Reporting and organizational statements make clear there is no single consensus beyond the shared premise that criticism of Israel can be either legitimate political speech or a vehicle for antisemitism depending on context — and that precise definitions matter because they shape law, campus policy, and public debate [1] [3] [2].