Which demographic groups are most likely to endorse common antisemitic tropes, according to recent national surveys?

1. Overall scale: a nontrivial minority endorses multiple tropes

ADL’s nationwide surveys show a measurable share of Americans agreeing with multiple classic anti-Jewish statements—ADL uses an index of 11–14 tropes and finds roughly 20–24% of Americans meeting thresholds for “extensive” antisemitic prejudice in recent fielding, with overall average endorsements rising slightly between 2022 and 2024 ^{[1] [3] [4]}.

2. Age: a reversal of prior patterns, with Millennials and younger adults prominent

Multiple ADL reports and the J7 comparative study find that Millennials (born 1981–1996) display the highest levels of trope endorsement among generations in recent fielding, and younger Americans overall have overtaken older cohorts in some measures of anti-Jewish beliefs—contrasting with earlier decades when older cohorts tended to score higher ^{[5] [1] [6]}. ADL’s topline also notes that while young adults (18–30) sometimes show lower rates on select measures, the generational gap has narrowed and in some analyses reversed ^[7].

3. Race and ethnicity: higher reported trope agreement among Black and Hispanic respondents

NORC’s partnered analysis of ADL data highlights that Black and Hispanic Americans report higher belief in anti-Jewish tropes and more negative anti‑Israel sentiment than other racial and ethnic groups, a pattern that persists even after controlling for religion, income and education ^[2]. ADL’s broader international work similarly signals variation by demographic group that warrants closer investigation of local contexts ^[5].

4. Politics, ideology and conspiratorial worldviews: the strongest correlates

Surveys repeatedly identify conspiracy thinking as one of the most powerful predictors of antisemitic trope endorsement: respondents in the upper quartile for conspiracy beliefs endorse roughly twice as many tropes as those in the bottom quartile, and anti‑Israel sentiment often co‑occurs with belief in classic tropes such as “Jews control media” or “dual loyalty” ^{[3] [8] [4]}. Political affiliation shows more mixed patterns in different fieldings—ADL’s June 2025 omnibus found comparable small shares of Republicans and Democrats agreeing with some tropes ^[9]—underscoring that conspiratorial and grievance narratives can cut across partisan lines.

5. International and survey‑to‑survey context: consistent threads, varying emphasis

ADL’s J7 and global Ipsos‑partnered studies report that younger people internationally more often endorse antisemitic tropes and that the “dual loyalty” and power tropes are common across countries, while the precise demographic emphases vary by place and methodology ^{[5] [10]}. The American Jewish Committee’s fall‑2024 work complements ADL by documenting impacts and perceptions of antisemitism domestically, but methodological differences between organizations mean direct comparisons require caution ^{[11] [12]}.

6. What the data do not settle and what to watch for

Reports rely on panels and question batteries that changed over time (ADL’s updated instrument with NORC and Qualtrics fielding is noted), and shifts in survey wording, sampling platforms, and recent geopolitical events (e.g., October 7 and the 2024–25 conflicts) complicate causal interpretation; ADL’s studies disclose their fielding windows and platforms but do not settle why certain cohorts shifted—plausible drivers include online networks, activist framing of Israel‑related debates, and the spread of conspiracy narratives ^{[4] [1] [3]}. Finally, the primary source for many claims is the ADL (and its research partners), an advocacy organization with a mission to track antisemitism—readers and researchers should account for that institutional perspective while weighing convergent evidence from NORC, AJC and international surveying ^{[4] [2] [11]}.