What are the primary drivers of Fulani herder–farmer violence in central Nigeria and how have they evolved since 2010?
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Executive summary
The Fulani herder–farmer violence in central Nigeria is driven by overlapping environmental stress (desertification and changing transhumance routes), competition over land and water amid weak land governance, and politicized ethnic–religious narratives that have intensified securitization and militarization; these drivers have interacted with the rise of armed Fulani-linked militias and local vigilantes to escalate fatal violence since 2010 [1] [2] [3]. Since 2010 the conflict has shifted from episodic resource disputes to widespread, increasingly lethal and geographically diffuse confrontations as migration southward, legal bans on grazing, and the weaponization of identity transformed both tactics and stakes [4] [2] [3].
1. The long-standing resource contest that became a national security crisis
What began as recurring competition over grazing routes and crop damage is rooted in a centuries‑old pastoralist‑farmer economy but became a national security crisis when southward transhumance increased pressure on arable areas in the Middle Belt, producing waves of fatalities and displacement across Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa and other states [1] [5] [2].
2. Environmental stress and changing mobility patterns
Drought, desertification and degraded soils have pushed many Fulani herders southward in search of pasture and water, altering traditional transhumance corridors and bringing herds into closer, more frequent contact with sedentary farmers — a key structural driver of conflict emphasized across sources [1] [6] [2].
3. Economic pressures, land use change and market incentives
Rising demand for beef in populous southern markets, changes in herd composition that permit cattle to survive in tsetse‑belt areas, and expanding settlements and agriculture have reduced available grazing and made conflict over land and watering points more acute, while opposition to ranching or grazing reserves has blocked state‑level mitigation [1] [2] [7].
4. Political economy, governance gaps and legal flashpoints
Weak, contested land tenure, the failure of past federal schemes (like the Rural Grazing Area proposal) and perceptions of government bias — sometimes framed around the ethnicity of political elites — have politicized disputes and undermined trust in formal mechanisms to adjudicate land and grazing rights [7] [5] [8].
5. Ethnic, religious framing and local mobilization
Although the immediate triggers are resource disputes, many clashes have been reframed along ethnic and religious lines — Fulani herders are mostly Muslim while many farmers in the Middle Belt are Christian — amplifying grievances, fuelling fear of “Islamisation” among some communities, and widening recruitment pools for armed actors on both sides [1] [2] [9].
6. Militarization: militias, banditry and the rise of Fulani armed groups
From roughly 2010 onwards the emergence of decentralized Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM) networks, the spread of weapons, and the opportunistic involvement of criminal and extremist actors transformed incidents into high‑casualty attacks; scholars link the FEM and other armed formations to the sharp growth in violent incidents and fatalities since 2010 [3] [4] [8].
7. How the drivers have evolved since 2010
Since 2010 the conflict has evolved from localized disputes to a regional, multi‑dimensional crisis: environmental drivers intensified migration patterns; policy responses such as southern state bans on open grazing galvanized anti‑Fulani discourse; armed groups and vigilantes escalated violence; and fatalities and displacements rose dramatically, with analysts counting thousands of deaths and noting that farmer‑herder clashes became one of West Africa’s deadliest forms of violence after 2010 [4] [2] [3].
8. Implications, contested narratives and gaps in reporting
Policy prescriptions range from securing grazing corridors and creating ranches to disarmament and improved land governance, yet such proposals are highly contested locally and risk politicization; reporting often conflates criminal banditry, ethnic militia attacks and ordinary pastoral disputes, and available sources do not resolve how many attacks are veteran pastoralists versus organized militias — a limitation in the public record that complicates attribution [7] [3] [10].
Conclusion
The violence between Fulani herders and farmers in central Nigeria is best understood as the product of interacting ecological stress, structural land and governance failures, economic incentives, and identity politics, which since 2010 have been amplified by armed mobilization and polarizing policy moves — meaning solutions must address environmental adaptation, land tenure reform, security de‑escalation and the political narratives that feed mutual distrust [1] [7] [3] [2].