What are the economic and social impacts of undocumented immigration on US communities?

1. Labor supply: who fills the jobs Americans do not want — and what happens if they leave

Researchers and central bankers report that immigrants — including many undocumented workers — have kept the working‑age population growing and filled jobs in construction, agriculture, hospitality, and care; the San Francisco Fed shows that without immigration the prime‑age labor force would have declined and notes recent sharp swings in net international migration that reduce labor‑force growth in 2025 ^[2]. Policy changes that cut immigration flows are estimated to reduce potential employment growth and shave 0.3–0.4 percentage points off 2025 GDP growth by constraining available workers for low‑wage, manual sectors ^[6].

2. Fiscal impacts: taxes paid vs. services used — competing estimates

Several policy centers and think tanks find that immigrants generally make net positive fiscal contributions when measured over long horizons: the Economic Policy Institute and allied reporting characterize the long‑run net fiscal impact of immigration as small but positive and say immigration reduces overall budget deficits when all levels of government are combined ^[1]. By contrast, some conservative‑leaning analyses (Manhattan Institute, House Budget Committee work) stress per‑capita public‑goods spending or calculate different short‑run fiscal pressures; the Manhattan Institute provides alternative accounting of federal public‑goods spending per person in 2025 ^[7]. The disagreement reflects different time horizons, which levels of government are counted, and assumptions about wages, use of services, and future demographic effects ^{[1] [7]}.

3. The modeled cost of mass deportation: big GDP and revenue hits

Multiple economic modeling efforts converge on the conclusion that mass removal of undocumented people would materially shrink output and revenues. The Penn Wharton Budget Model projects a $300.4 billion revenue shortfall from 2025–2034 and large increases in primary deficits under mass‑deportation scenarios ^[3]. Baker Institute and Joint Economic Committee analyses likewise estimate multi‑percent declines in GDP over a decade or multi‑year periods if deportations were large in scale — with state‑level hits (e.g., Texas) concentrated in sectors that employ many undocumented workers ^{[4] [5]}.

4. Public services, healthcare and schooling: concentrated local pressures and behavioral responses

Localities sometimes report strains in schools, hospitals and social services when arrivals are rapid, but researchers note that many undocumented people pay taxes while being largely ineligible for federal safety‑net programs, complicating simple “burden” narratives ^{[8] [9]}. Surveys and policy notes document that enforcement‑heavy periods change immigrant behavior: fears of enforcement lead immigrants to avoid schools, health care, and interacting with police — outcomes that carry social and public‑safety implications not always captured in fiscal models ^{[10] [11]}.

5. Crime and public safety: evidence diverges from political rhetoric

Scholarly summaries emphasize that overall crime rates are not driven up by immigrants and some studies link increased immigration to stable or lower crime rates; however, political actors emphasize high‑profile criminal cases and argue enforcement is needed ^{[9] [12]}. Available reporting documents arrests and enforcement actions under the 2025 administration, but broader empirical conclusions on crime and immigration remain contested across sources ^{[13] [9]}.

6. Social cohesion, children, and long‑settled communities

Advocacy groups and local officials highlight that many undocumented residents are long‑settled, work, raise U.S. citizen children, and start businesses — meaning enforcement shocks can sever family ties, reduce consumer demand and shrink local tax bases ^{[8] [14]}. The American Immigration Council stresses that mass deportation would separate millions of citizen children from parents ^[14]. Polling and health surveys show increased fear and adverse health impacts among immigrant families tied to enforcement spikes ^{[11] [10]}.

7. Why the numbers differ — methodology, time frames and political lenses

Differences among the Pew, academic, think‑tank and advocacy outputs often stem from datasets used (ACS, CPS, administrative records), assumptions about future behavior (self‑deportation, remittances, participation in services), and whether analyses count short‑term budget windows or long‑run fiscal contributions ^{[15] [1] [7]}. Some organizations emphasize immediate local costs and enforcement expenses; others emphasize tax contributions and long‑run demographic benefits — both perspectives are supported in the literature provided ^{[3] [1] [7]}.

Limitations: available sources here do not settle every disputed claim (for example, precise nationwide per‑year fiscal balances by immigration status vary by methodology) and many findings depend on scenario assumptions (mass deportation vs. status regularization) that change results ^{[3] [4] [7]}. Use these studies as complementary perspectives rather than definitive answers; policymakers’ choices about enforcement, legalization, or labor‑market integration determine the economic and social outcomes documented above ^{[6] [3]}.