What evidence exists on voluntary out‑migration in response to increased immigration enforcement in 2025?
Executive summary
Multiple data streams and policy signals from 2025 indicate that increased enforcement coincided with measurable rises in people leaving the United States voluntarily, but the scale is contested: independent economists at Brookings estimate 210,000–405,000 additional voluntary departures in 2025 compared with a counterfactual, while federal agencies have issued much larger tallies and other analysts point to alternative explanations and data gaps [1] [2] [3].
1. What the independent estimates show: Brookings’ modeling of “extra” voluntary departures
Brookings’ January 2026 update concludes net migration was likely negative in 2025 and attributes that partly to voluntary departures tied to stepped‑up enforcement, estimating between 210,000 and 405,000 people voluntarily left in 2025 beyond what would have occurred without heightened enforcement — and warning that the figure could reach 575,000 in 2026 if removals rise — while explicitly contrasting its assumptions with those of the CBO (which projects positive net migration) and noting limited direct data on voluntary exits [1].
2. The administration’s accounting and incentives: DHS claims and programs
Department of Homeland Security public statements and press releases report far larger numbers of voluntary self‑deportations — in some releases claiming well over a million people have “self‑deported” in 2025 and announcing financial travel assistance and stipends to incentivize voluntary departures via a rebranded CBP Home program — figures and programs that, if accurate in part, create a plausible mechanism for increased voluntary out‑migration but also reflect the agency’s public‑relations and policy goals [2] [4] [3] [5].
3. Court and administrative data: voluntary departure while detained and removals
Court and immigration‑system data show a sharp increase in court‑authorized voluntary departures for people in detention — Reuters reports more than a five‑fold rise to over 16,000 granted voluntary departure in the first eight months of 2025 compared with the prior year — while administrative removal counts are themselves higher than in previous years, both of which contribute to aggregate outflows but do not fully capture people who choose to leave outside formal programs [6] [7].
4. Behavioral and population signals: border encounters, unauthorized stock, and surveys
Complementary indicators align with the story of reduced arrivals and some departures: Migration Policy records a dramatic drop in southwest border encounters from 88,000 monthly (prior year) to roughly 7,000 monthly in Feb–Nov 2025, Pew sketching a likely decline in the unauthorized population by up to about 1 million in early 2025, and KFF/New York Times survey data documenting widespread immigrant fears and avoidance behavior that plausibly raise the probability of voluntary departure — together these data imply both lower inflows and behavioral drivers of out‑migration, though none directly enumerate voluntary exits [8] [9] [10].
5. Why estimates diverge: methods, incentives and political framing
Differences between the Brookings estimate, the CBO’s more positive net migration estimate, DHS public tallies, and media summaries trace to diverging methodological choices — whether voluntary departures are modeled as responsive to enforcement, how removals are counted, and whether agency program participants are recorded as “voluntary” — and to institutional incentives: DHS has political reasons to amplify program uptake while independent researchers emphasize counterfactual modeling and uncertainty [1] [7] [2].
6. Limitations, open questions and where the evidence is weak
Available sources concede important gaps: Brookings itself notes “little data” to directly measure increased voluntary exit rates in 2025; DHS figures mix voluntary programs, administrative removals and self‑reported departures in ways that are hard to independently verify; and surveys and border encounter drops are suggestive but cannot alone quantify voluntary out‑migration, leaving uncertainty about the precise scale, demographic composition, and whether departures were permanent or temporary [1] [2] [10] [8].
7. Bottom line — what the evidence supports and what remains unresolved
The preponderance of evidence—econometric estimates, administrative upticks in voluntary departure authorizations, incentive programs, and survey‑documented fear and avoidance—supports the conclusion that enforcement in 2025 produced nontrivial voluntary out‑migration, but the magnitude is contested (hundreds of thousands by Brookings versus agency claims in the millions) and attribution remains sensitive to modeling choices and data quality; independent, transparent counting of program participants and post‑departure follow‑up would be required to resolve the gap [1] [2] [6] [10].