How have Muslim-majority countries' fertility rates changed since 1990 and what drives the shifts?
This fact-check may be outdated. Consider refreshing it to get the most current information.
Executive summary
Muslim-majority countries have undergone a major fertility decline since 1990: average total fertility across the 49 Muslim-majority states fell from about 4.3 children per woman in 1990–95 to roughly 2.9 in 2010–15 (Pew), with many countries cutting fertility by half or more over three decades (Hoover/UNPD analysis) [1] [2]. Analysts attribute the drop to the standard drivers of demographic transition — education (especially for girls), urbanization, rising incomes and contraception — rather than a single “Islamic” cause; regression work finds income, literacy, contraceptive prevalence and desired fertility explain the bulk of cross‑country differences [2] [1].
1. A continent‑spanning decline: the headline numbers
Across nearly every Muslim‑majority country with available data, fertility fell between 1990 and the 2010s: the Pew compilation reports the 49 Muslim‑majority countries moved from an average TFR of 4.3 (1990–95) to about 2.9 (2010–15) [1], while synthesis of UNPD data finds all 48 countries with usable series witnessed declines and that 22 experienced fertility cuts of 50% or more — ten by 60% or more — over roughly three decades [2].
2. Big drops, big variation: who fell fastest
Declines were not uniform. Some countries recorded dramatic absolute falls — AEI and Hoover note several Muslim‑majority states were among the largest two‑decade fertility drops recorded globally, with four countries each losing more than 4.5 births per woman in twenty years [3] [2]. By contrast, a handful of high‑fertility Sahelian cases saw smaller absolute change because they began from extremely high baselines [2].
3. Why the decline tracks classic development patterns
Empirical analyses link most fertility change to well‑known correlates: rising per‑capita incomes, greater female literacy and schooling, wider use of modern contraception, and falling desired family size emerge as the best statistical predictors in regressions that explain over 90% of cross‑country fertility differences in samples that include Muslim‑majority states [2]. Pew’s reporting likewise highlights education, improved living standards and urbanization as key factors lowering birth rates [1] [4].
4. Religion matters — but indirectly
Available sources caution against a simplistic causal story that religion alone determines fertility. Pew states that religiosity may influence family size but operates within a mix of cultural, social and economic forces; fertility appears driven by that complex mixture rather than religion in isolation [1]. Hoover’s work treats national fertility data from overwhelmingly Muslim populations as a proxy for “the Muslim world” but emphasizes standard socioeconomic variables as the primary drivers [2].
5. Youth bulge and momentum: why population still grows
Even as TFRs fall, Muslim populations continue to grow because of demographic momentum: a large share of Muslims live in younger age groups. Pew projects that by 2030 about 29% of the world’s 15–29 year‑olds will be Muslim — up from 20% in 1990 — and that population growth rates will slow but remain positive as fertility approaches replacement in many places [5] [1].
6. Regional differences and policy effects
Regional histories matter. North Africa and parts of Asia show steep declines associated with development and family‑planning programs; the Gulf saw different patterns tied to oil‑era demographic dynamics; several sub‑Saharan Muslim‑majority states lag behind the transition [6] [2]. Country‑level policy and timing — for example early family‑planning initiatives or rapid urbanization — shape the pace of decline [6] [2].
7. Competing interpretations and what to watch
Sources broadly agree on the trend and main drivers, but interpretations differ on emphasis: policy‑oriented accounts stress family‑planning programs and contraception [2], while broad surveys highlight education and economic development [1]. Commentators warning against monolithic cultural explanations note fertility falls even where Islamic movements were strong, undermining a simple “religion caused high fertility” thesis [6] [3].
Limitations and gaps in current reporting: the datasets cited aggregate national averages across 48–49 countries and therefore mask within‑country diversity and urban/rural splits; sources do not provide a comprehensive, country‑by‑country year‑by‑year TFR table in the excerpts provided here [1] [2]. Available sources do not mention detailed recent (post‑2015) TFR series for every Muslim‑majority country in this packet; for those specifics consult the UNPD or national statistical offices cited by Pew and UNPD [1] [2].