Keep Factually independent
Whether you agree or disagree with our analysis, these conversations matter for democracy. We don't take money from political groups - even a $5 donation helps us keep it that way.
How will birth and death rates in Gaza change over the next five years?
Executive summary
Available reporting shows a sharp recent fall in recorded births in Gaza and steep rises in maternal and newborn risks: Gazan authorities recorded 17,000 births in the first half of 2025 — a 41% drop from 29,000 in the same period in 2022 — and agencies warn of catastrophic birth outcomes and rising maternal deaths [1] [2] [3]. Academic and humanitarian sources document huge excess mortality from the 2023–25 conflict and collapsing services that make near‑term increases in mortality and suppressed fertility likely; however, precise five‑year trajectories are not given in current reporting [4] [1] [2].
1. What the recent data show: births plunged and health systems collapsed
Gazan health ministry figures used by UN agencies show recorded births fell from about 29,000 in the first half of 2022 to 17,000 in the first half of 2025 — a decline of roughly 41% — while UNFPA, UNICEF and other aid groups describe maternity wards understaffed, supplies stranded at borders and ambulances barely operating, all driving “catastrophic birth outcomes” [2] [1] [5].
2. Why births are down now: security, displacement, and choices under siege
Reports attribute the drop to a combination of factors: mass displacement, the breakdown of referral and ambulance systems, food insecurity and psychological trauma that deter family formation and impede access to antenatal care and safe delivery — turning normally treatable pregnancy complications into lethal events [2] [5] [6].
3. Immediate mortality trends: rising maternal and neonatal deaths reported
UNFPA and allied reporting note surges in maternal deaths (UNFPA’s press materials and news summaries cite as many as 220 maternal deaths in the first six months of 2025) and newborn mortality in facilities, with newborns dying within 24 hours and sharing scarce incubators — indicators that maternal and neonatal mortality have risen sharply amid the health‑system collapse [2] [3].
4. Longer‑term demographic context: pre‑war fertility was higher than today’s short‑term drop
Before the recent crisis Gaza’s fertility and growth rates were substantially higher; data aggregated for West Bank and Gaza show crude birth rates and total fertility (e.g., TFR around 3–4 historically), and academic work has calculated excess mortality in 2023 that dramatically altered death counts — meaning the 2025 declines are a departure from prior demographic patterns [7] [8] [4].
5. Plausible five‑year scenarios based on available evidence
Available sources do not provide modelled five‑year forecasts. Based on documented drivers, plausible scenarios include: (a) continued low recorded births and elevated maternal/neonatal deaths if conflict, displacement and blockades persist; (b) partial rebound in births if services and humanitarian access are restored and public confidence recovers; or (c) a prolonged demographic stagnation if lethal conditions or widespread out‑migration continue. The sources support these qualitative possibilities but do not supply quantitative projections [1] [2] [4].
6. Sources disagree or bring different emphases — read each with its agenda
UN agencies (UNFPA, UNICEF) frame the decline as a humanitarian emergency calling for immediate aid, highlighting stranded supplies and service collapse [2] [5]. Humanitarian NGOs like Save the Children focus on daily births and clinical risks amid siege conditions [6]. Opinion and regional outlets like Middle East Monitor and MERIP present broader political interpretations — describing this as “war on reproduction” or alleging dramatically reduced growth rates — which reflect advocacy and political framing alongside factual claims [9] [10]. Each source has an implicit agenda: UN/NGO releases prioritize urgent relief; advocacy outlets interpret demographic change as a policy outcome.
7. Key data gaps and what would improve forecasts
Current reporting lacks consistent, independently verified time‑series data, formal demographic projections, and clear age‑specific birth and death rates post‑2023; academic work has reconstructed 2023 mortality but not produced five‑year fertility/mortality forecasts. Without such modelling and unimpeded data collection, precise five‑year quantitative forecasts are not possible from available sources [4].
8. What to watch next (indicators that will determine the trend)
Watch for: [11] restoration or continued obstruction of humanitarian corridors and medical supplies (UNFPA reports on trucks stuck at borders are pivotal) [2]; [12] official Gazan birth and maternal mortality registers over subsequent quarters; [13] independent assessments of neonatal and under‑five mortality from academic and UN missions; and [14] changes in displacement and migration that affect the number of women of childbearing age — all of which the cited sources identify as critical to outcomes [2] [1] [4].
Limitations: available sources describe strong short‑term signals and large risks but do not contain formal five‑year demographic projections; any numeric forecast beyond the near term would require modelling not present in current reporting [1] [2] [4].