How do age and socio-economic factors change comparisons of crime rates between migrants and UK-born people?
Executive summary
When raw arrest, conviction or prison-population figures are compared, migrants and non-citizens in the UK can appear overrepresented — but much of that apparent gap is explained by age and socio‑economic composition: migrants are disproportionately young adults and, in some groups, concentrated in lower‑paid jobs and disadvantaged neighbourhoods, both of which raise measured offending rates irrespective of nationality [1] [2]. When researchers control for age, sex, education and income the immigrant–native gap narrows substantially and in many studies disappears or reverses, though results vary by migrant cohort, origin and offence type [3] [4] [5].
1. Age: the single largest distorting factor
Criminal offending is highly concentrated among young adults, especially young men, and the UK’s migrant population is younger on average than the UK‑born population; therefore unadjusted comparisons inflate migrants’ share of convictions and prisoners simply because of age structure rather than different propensities to offend [1] [6]. Multiple UK studies note that once age and sex are accounted for, foreign‑born people are no more likely — and in some analyses less likely — to be in prison or to be arrested than British‑born residents [2] [7].
2. Socio‑economic status: unemployment, education and neighbourhoods matter
Socio‑economic factors — education, income, employment status and local deprivation — are tightly linked to recorded crime; migrants from different waves show different labour‑market positions and therefore different crime associations, which can explain apparent increases or falls in local crime after large inflows [8] [5]. Economists and criminologists argue that relative deprivation and unemployment, not migration per se, often drive observed correlations between immigrant concentrations and certain offences [4]. Studies of specific waves (for example A8 Eastern European migrants) find no detrimental crime impact and note that higher employment among those migrants likely contributed to stable or falling property crime [2] [4].
3. What the UK evidence shows when adjustments are applied
Panel and microdata analyses focused on England and Wales typically find that aggregation without controls can mislead: a 2013 LSE study of large immigrant waves reports no robust rise in crime attributable to migration once local labour‑market and demographic factors are included, and victimization data do not point to migrants causing overall increases in recorded offences [8] [5]. The Migration Observatory similarly emphasises that non‑citizens’ greater concentration among young adults explains much of the higher conviction or custody shares seen in unadjusted stats [1] [4]. Conversely, some aggregate studies produce mixed results across time and origin groups, underscoring heterogeneity across migrant types [9].
4. Mechanisms, heterogeneity and data limits
Several mechanisms can bias raw comparisons: differences in offence types (some migrant groups are overrepresented in certain categories), policing and prosecutorial focus, and under‑counting of migrant populations in surveys and denominators; official data sources (ONS, MoJ) have useful breakdowns but researchers caution about measuring the true size and composition of migrant groups, especially recent arrivals and irregular migrants [10] [11] [4]. There is also clear heterogeneity by origin, generation and reason for migration — asylum seekers, labour migrants and second‑generation residents show distinct patterns — so one single “migrant vs UK‑born” comparison masks internal variation [3] [9].
5. Implications for interpretation, policy and public debate
The policy takeaway is that headline statistics should not be read as evidence that migration causes more crime: robust inference requires controls for age, sex, socio‑economic status and local labour conditions, plus transparency about denominators and policing practices [1] [4]. That nuance is often absent in media and political narratives, which can incentivise an inflated “migrant‑crime” frame; nonetheless specific concerns remain — for particular offences, cohorts or areas — and merit targeted local interventions informed by data rather than by aggregate rhetoric [7] [9].