IHRA definition antisemitism is itself prejudiced
Executive summary
The IHRA working definition of antisemitism has become a polarizing tool: supporters say it clarifies contemporary antisemitism, while critics contend its Israel-related examples are used to stifle legitimate criticism and thus function politically rather than purely pedagogically [1][2]. Recent municipal actions—most notably New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s revocation of the city’s IHRA adoption—have crystallized those critiques and defenses into a public flashpoint [3][4].
1. Background: what the IHRA definition actually says
The IHRA working definition describes antisemitism as “a certain perception of Jews” that may be expressed as hatred toward Jewish people and lists 11 illustrative examples, seven of which relate to Israel and include phrases such as “denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination” and “claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour” [1].
2. Critics’ argument: a tool that can be weaponized to censor Israel criticism
A broad coalition of scholars, human rights groups and critics argues that because several IHRA examples explicitly connect criticism of Israel to antisemitism, pro-Israel actors have mobilized the definition to label political dissent as hate speech and chill protest and academic debate, a pattern documented by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty-adjacent reporting and peer-reviewed critiques [5][6][7].
3. Defenders’ argument: guidance not law, no enforcement mechanism
Proponents—represented in reporting by Jewish advocacy groups and the World Jewish Congress—contend the IHRA text is a nonbinding, educational tool without legal enforcement, intended to help institutions recognize contemporary forms of antisemitism, and therefore cannot by itself prohibit speech [2][8].
4. Political consequences: how adoption or revocation shifts power and perception
Municipal and national adoptions have had political consequences: supporters say adoption strengthens the ability to track and combat antisemitism, while opponents point to cases where institutions or governments used IHRA-linked language to discipline or investigate pro-Palestinian activists, creating real-world disputes about free expression—accounts underpinning both sides of the debate appear across reporting on the New York reversal [9][5][10].
5. The Mamdani moment: a test case that illustrates the accusation of prejudice
Zohran Mamdani’s revocation of New York City’s IHRA-based executive order drew denunciations that the move would weaken protections against antisemitism and praise from advocates who said the definition was “overly broad” and used to censor Israel criticism, laying bare the competing political agendas—Jewish organizations framed the revocation as endangering the city’s ability to confront antisemitism, while groups like CAIR-NY welcomed the change as resistance to what they called a tool used to suppress criticism of Israeli policy [9][11][12].
6. Assessment: is the IHRA definition itself prejudiced?
Labeling the IHRA definition itself “prejudiced” requires distinguishing the text from its uses: the definition’s language links some forms of Israel criticism to antisemitism, which critics argue has a discriminatory effect when applied to silence particular political viewpoints, and scholars have documented how those examples can and have been instrumentalized in ways that disproportionately shield Israel from critique—these documented patterns support the claim that the definition can function prejudicially in practice, even if the drafters intended a neutral tool [6][5][7]; defenders counter that the definition does not inherently ban speech and that misuse by third parties does not make the wording itself an act of prejudice, an argument reflected by organizations that promote the IHRA text [2].
7. Conclusion and limits of the record
The evidence in public reporting and scholarship shows the IHRA definition is contested terrain: its Israel-focused examples create a genuine risk of being used to suppress political dissent and thus can produce prejudicial outcomes in practice, while supporters argue the text remains a nonbinding diagnostic aid that by itself is not an act of prejudice; the overall judgment depends on whether the focus is on textual intent and form (where defenders have a point) or on documented patterns of application and consequence (where critics have a strong case) [1][6][2][5]. Reporting examined here does not resolve whether every use of IHRA-based language is prejudiced, and it cannot substitute for case-by-case legal or institutional analyses that were beyond the scope of the sources reviewed [6].