Remaining nuclear weapons treaties between Russia and west
Executive summary
New START has been the last major U.S.–Russia nuclear arms control treaty, but Moscow suspended participation in it in 2023 and signalled inconsistent commitment thereafter; Russia told the U.S. in 2025 it would observe New START limits past its Feb. 5, 2026 expiry only if the United States did so [1] [2]. Russia has also declared it no longer feels bound by the 1987 INF Treaty and announced it will not abide by INF obligations in 2025 [3] [4]. Reporting and policy analysis warn that these moves leave few bilateral legal constraints on strategic and intermediate-range systems and raise the risk of a new arms race [5] [6].
1. What remains of the treaty framework — technically and politically
Legally, New START is the only bilateral treaty that, until recently, constrained deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems; Russia suspended participation in New START in February 2023 and later framed any further observance as conditional on reciprocal U.S. behavior, creating legal and political uncertainty about its future beyond February 5, 2026 [1] [2]. The INF Treaty — which banned ground-launched missiles with ranges of roughly 500–5,500 km — has effectively collapsed: multiple outlets report that Russia declared it no longer considers itself bound by the INF and announced non‑compliance in 2025 [3] [4]. Analysts and think tanks describe the web of Cold War era restraints as largely disintegrated [6] [5].
2. Why these two treaties matter in practice
New START set verifiable numerical limits and inspection mechanisms on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers; the State Department notes the treaty’s central limits (e.g., the 700 delivery‑vehicle cap and constraints on deployed warheads) and highlights how extension would preserve verifiable restraint on systems that can reach the United States [7]. The INF ban removed an entire class of intermediate-range ground‑launched missiles from Europe, so Russia’s exit reopens scope for deployments that narrow warning times and increase crisis instability [3] [4].
3. What officials and analysts say about the collapse and risks
Kremlin officials have argued distrust and wider geopolitical competition make new arms‑reduction deals unlikely, warning of proliferation to other states and framing Western actions as threatening [6]. Western analysts and institutions warn the waning of these treaties risks a renewed arms race, increases opacity around arsenals and removes inspection regimes that reduce misunderstanding — precisely the mechanisms that arms control was designed to preserve [5] [8].
4. Russia’s public posture and conditional offers
In 2025 Russian statements offered conditionality: President Putin publicly said Russia would continue to abide by New START limits past the treaty’s formal expiry date if the United States did likewise — a political signal rather than a legally binding extension [2]. Earlier, Moscow had suspended data exchanges under New START while asserting it might observe limits; U.S. officials have treated such suspensions as legally invalid and raised compliance concerns [2] [1].
5. What this means for tactical and emerging systems
Available sources emphasize a gap in controlling tactical (non‑strategic) nuclear weapons and several novel delivery systems. Multiple reports note there is no existing treaty that caps tactical warheads, and that Russia and other powers are modernizing or developing systems (e.g., hypersonic glide vehicles, new cruise and undersea systems) that fall partly or wholly outside older frameworks [9] [2] [7]. Analysts flag that this legal vacuum increases strategic ambiguity and could incentivize further modernization [5].
6. Competing perspectives and possible hidden agendas
Russian officials frame treaty withdrawals and suspensions as defensive reactions to NATO posture and Western actions, aiming to shift blame and extract concessions [6]. Western sources and analysts treat Russia’s moves as escalatory and dangerous, emphasizing verification loss and increased risk of miscalculation [5] [8]. Both sides have incentives to signal restraint or menace: Russia to deter Western pressure, Western leaders to justify nuclear modernization budgets — each framing serves domestic and geopolitical audiences [6] [2].
7. Bottom line and what to watch next
With INF effectively ended and New START participation suspended and politically conditional, the bilateral legal guardrails that constrained strategic and intermediate-range systems are limping or gone, increasing the odds of competition in range, numbers and novel delivery modes [3] [1] [5]. Watch for formal Russian or U.S. statements about extending New START limits, resumed inspections or new multilateral talks; available sources do not mention any finalized replacement treaty as of the latest reporting [2] [5].