Us political violence incidents right wing left wing
Executive summary
U.S. political violence in 2025 shows a complex, multi‑factional picture: academic datasets find left‑wing incidents rose in the first half of 2025 (five incidents vs. one right‑wing incident in that window), while long‑running research and government reporting emphasize that right‑wing and jihadist attacks have historically been more frequent and deadlier (CSIS; FactCheck.org; Reuters) [1] [2] [3].
1. A spike in attention, not a settled verdict
Media coverage after high‑profile events — including the September assassination of Charlie Kirk — focused public attention on political violence and prompted new claims about which side is more responsible; outlets differ in emphasis. CSIS’s dataset shows left‑wing incidents rose in recent years and recorded five left‑wing terrorist incidents versus one right‑wing incident in the first half of 2025 (through July 4) [1]. FactCheck.org and PBS note that the CSIS window and definitions leave room for interpretation, and that overall historical patterns still show significant right‑wing and jihadist lethality [2] [4].
2. What the data actually measured
CSIS defines domestic “terrorist attacks and plots” narrowly and compiled 750 incidents from 1994–July 4, 2025; its authors say left‑wing violence has risen “from very low levels” but still remains below historic right‑wing and jihadist violence in terms of fatalities and volume [1]. FactCheck.org cites the same CSIS brief to report the 5 vs. 1 incident split in early 2025 and underscores that the dataset did not include some later high‑profile killings such as Charlie Kirk [2].
3. Historical context matters
Multiple analysts warn the short‑term upticks should be seen against decades of patterns. Longstanding studies and federal reporting have found far‑right actors produced larger numbers of plots and fatalities over the last decade; Just Security and other analysts stress that even with 2025’s trends, far‑right incidents have outpaced far‑left actions historically [5]. PBS and other outlets emphasize that right‑wing extremist violence has tended to be more frequent and deadly in many datasets [4].
4. Definitions and coding change the story
Different groups use distinct definitions of “terrorism,” “political violence,” and “vigilantism,” and that affects counts. ACLED and academic projects focus on politically motivated violence broadly, while CSIS limited its analysis to incidents meeting its terrorism criteria; the Bridging Divides Initiative and ACLED flag an increase in vigilante incidents and targeted violence against marginalized groups in 2024 and into 2025 [6] [1]. PBS notes that labeling affects who investigates incidents and how they are tallied [4].
5. Fatalities and spectacular events skew perceptions
A few high‑fatality attacks alter the public threat picture: Reuters reported at least 21 people killed in political violence since January 2025, including 14 killed in an ISIS‑inspired New Orleans attack — an event that dwarfed many domestic incidents in lethality [3]. Commentators and analysts warn that dramatic assassinations and mass casualty events drive media cycles and can create the sense that one side is suddenly dominant even when longer trends differ [3] [7].
6. Politics shapes narratives and policy responses
Political leaders and administrations frame the issue according to policy aims. The White House in 2025 emphasized attacks on ICE and designated antifa‑linked activity in a national counter‑terrorism directive, framing recent violence as organized anti‑state action [8]. Conversely, critics of certain reports argue that short‑run figures can be weaponized to justify crackdowns on particular movements; Just Security urged caution about overstating left‑wing terrorism based on a handful of incidents [5].
7. Public concern and fear are measurable and bipartisan
Surveys show Americans broadly expect political violence to increase and fear high‑profile outcomes such as assassinations; POLITICO and Pew polling found significant public anxiety and disagreement about causes, with partisans often blaming the other side [9] [10]. That public fear itself reverberates through politics, making violence both a cause and consequence of polarization [10].
8. Bottom line for readers
Available sources show a short‑term rise in counted left‑wing terrorist incidents in early 2025 but also stress that long‑term data still point to far‑right and jihadist violence as historically deadlier and more frequent; counting methods, time windows, and definitions materially change conclusions [1] [5] [4]. Analysts and officials disagree on emphasis and policy response, so readers should treat single studies or short windows as part of a broader, contested empirical picture [2] [8].