How have trends in migrant-related crime rates in England changed since 2015 and what drives those changes?
Executive summary
Since 2015, overall recorded property and violent crime in England and Wales has trended downward or held steady while the foreign‑born share of the population rose; detailed studies find no evidence that higher migration caused falling crime rates [1]. At the same time, specific metrics — foreign‑national representation in prisons and some headline statistics about particular offence types — have drawn political attention; arrivals by small boats rose to 36,816 in 2024 and organised‑crime activity around crossings changed risk patterns and harms [2] and government reporting on foreign national offenders is being expanded to give more detail [3].
1. Big picture: crime down, migration up — correlation without proven causation
Long‑run data show property crime in England and Wales has fallen while the foreign‑born share of the population increased, a pattern emphasised by the Migration Observatory which cautions that correlation is not causation and that analyses to date do not find migration caused the crime decline [1]. The ONS has noted a “general downward trend” in violent crime since the 1990s even as migration patterns shifted, and watchdogs point to the complexity of attributing changes to migration alone [4] [1].
2. Where numbers get political: foreign nationals in criminal‑justice snapshots
Government and parliamentary sources increasingly publish specific measures — arrests, convictions, prison population by nationality — and those snapshots have been used in public debate. The Home Office announced plans to publish more detailed reporting on foreign national offenders and deportations by the end of 2025, acknowledging data‑quality issues in existing systems [3]. Parliamentary debate and press stories have cited counts of charges linked to asylum hotel residents and similar figures to argue a local crime problem, but those counts do not by themselves establish population‑level risk comparisons [5] [3].
3. Small boats, organised crime and a changing risk landscape
Irregular maritime crossings have risen and fallen year‑to‑year: the National Crime Agency reports 36,816 small‑boat arrivals in 2024 — up 25% on 2023 but below 2022 — and links the change to greater opportunity, migrant demand, favourable crossing conditions and elevated organised‑crime group intent [2]. The NCA also flags that organised‑crime dynamics (larger boats, overcrowding, cost pressures) drove a sharp rise in migrant fatalities from 12 in 2023 to 78 in 2024 and increased harm even where criminal offending by migrants is a distinct question [2].
4. What drives any apparent differences in offending rates
Research emphasises mechanisms other than nationality per se: labour‑market opportunities, age structure and selection effects matter. The Migration Observatory highlights that migrant groups’ employment, age profile and integration opportunities strongly shape crime outcomes, and that studies controlling for these factors do not support a simple causal link from migration to increased crime [1]. Advocacy and research groups urge disaggregation by nationality, age and time‑since‑arrival because aggregated statistics can mask important variation [6] [1].
5. Data limits that shape the debate
Available sources repeatedly warn of limits: many routine crime surveys and prison statistics undercount recent migrants; administrative systems do not reliably record immigration status or duration of residence; and some public claims rely on partial press counts or single datasets without context [3] [7] [5]. The ONS says its publications concern victim experience and police records while the MoJ holds offender data, so cross‑referencing is necessary and incomplete [8].
6. Competing narratives and why they persist
Political actors and media outlets emphasise specific statistics (e.g., foreign‑national shares in prison, charges in asylum hotels, or analyses by advocacy think‑tanks) to argue migration is a security problem; others — academic briefings and independent fact‑checks — stress declining crime trends and methodological limits to linking migration to crime [5] [1] [9]. The Migration Watch briefings and some think‑tank analyses call for more disaggregated publication of migrant crime rates, while Migration Observatory and ONS sources caution against simplistic interpretation [6] [1] [8].
7. What responsible reporting and policy should do next
Good policy requires better data and nuanced framing. The Home Office’s commitment to more detailed FNO reporting acknowledges current gaps [3]. Analysts need datasets that include age, length of residence and immigration status to disentangle selection and structural drivers [7] [1]. Meanwhile, journalists and politicians should avoid amplifying single figures (charges, hotel counts, or raw prison shares) without those adjustments and context [5] [9].
Limitations: available sources do not provide a complete year‑by‑year crime‑by‑migration breakdown since 2015; they warn that many headline comparisons are affected by measurement, demographic and selection issues [1] [3] [7].