How do Muslim American fertility rates compare to US national averages in 2020–2025?

Executive Summary

Survey evidence from 2024–2025 shows Muslim Americans are more likely than other religious groups to be parents of minor children, with about 42% reporting a child under 18 at home, but these surveys do not provide a direct total fertility rate (TFR) for Muslim Americans in 2020–2025 and therefore cannot produce a precise TFR comparison to the U.S. average for that period ^{[1] [2]}. Older demographic estimates and global data indicate Muslim fertility has historically exceeded U.S. averages—for example a 2011 regional estimate placed U.S. Muslim fertility near 2.5 children per woman, above the roughly 2.1 U.S. replacement-level average—yet those figures predate 2020 and experts cited that fertility among Muslims tends to converge toward national norms across generations ^{[3] [4]}. Several sources in the dossier explicitly note the absence of a direct, recent TFR comparison for 2020–2025 ^{[5] [6] [7]}.

1. Why parental-status surveys show Muslim Americans as more family-centered — and what that does and doesn’t prove

National surveys from early and mid-2025 report that about 42% of Muslim-identifying adults say they are parents or guardians of minor children living at home, contrasted with 27–29% among some other religious groups, indicating a stronger presence of children in Muslim households during this period ^{[1] [2]}. These statistics are direct measures of households with children rather than completed fertility measures like lifetime births per woman; they reflect current age structure and family composition as much as fertility behavior, and therefore can signal higher recent childbearing or a younger adult population. The surveys do not calculate a total fertility rate for Muslim Americans in 2020–2025, so household-parenting prevalence cannot be converted into a precise TFR without age-specific birth rates and population denominators ^{[1] [2]}.

2. Older demographic estimates and international context that point to higher Muslim fertility historically

Demographic summaries and regional data compiled in earlier research show Muslim populations frequently have higher fertility rates than national averages, with a 2011 estimate for U.S. Muslims around 2.5 children per woman—higher than the U.S. national average near 2.1—though that estimate is dated and based on population compositions from a prior decade ^[3]. Global analyses note that Muslim-majority populations averaged around 3.1 children per woman in 2010–2015, underscoring that higher fertility among Muslims has been a persistent international pattern, but global averages cannot be directly applied to the U.S. context without accounting for migration selectivity, socioeconomic differences, and assimilation dynamics ^[4].

3. What the dossier’s sources explicitly say about data gaps for 2020–2025

Several of the provided documents and analyses plainly state that no direct, recent TFR comparison for Muslim Americans versus the U.S. average in 2020–2025 is available within the cited material, and some entries in the dossier lack relevant data for the specified timeframe altogether ^{[5] [6] [7]}. The 2024–2025 surveys give strong evidence on parental status and age structure but stop short of producing completed-fertility measures; older demographic estimates offer suggestive context but are out-of-date for the requested period ^{[1] [2] [3] [4]}.

4. How demographers interpret trends and what to expect going forward

Demographic research cited in the dossier indicates fertility differences between religious or immigrant-origin groups typically decline across generations, as educational attainment, female labor force participation, and assimilation influence childbearing choices; the 2011 commentary flagged that higher fertility among Muslims in the U.S. was likely to fall toward the national average over time as immigrant proportions decline and later generations adopt prevailing norms ^[3]. The available 2024–2025 parental-status data are consistent with a younger Muslim adult profile and more households with children, but they do not contradict the documented long-term tendency toward convergence, and they underscore the need for age-specific birth-rate data to measure that transition precisely ^{[1] [2] [3]}.

5. Bottom line for the specific 2020–2025 comparison and what evidence is needed next

The evidence in the dossier supports the qualitative claim that Muslim Americans in the 2020–2025 window are more likely than other groups to be raising children at home, implying relatively higher recent childbearing or a younger adult cohort, but it does not provide a direct, dated total fertility rate for Muslim Americans that can be numerically compared with the U.S. TFR for 2020–2025 ^{[1] [2] [5]}. To produce a definitive numeric comparison for 2020–2025 researchers must supply age-specific birth rates or estimated TFRs for Muslim Americans in that interval; absent those, the best-supported conclusion is higher parental prevalence and suggestive—but not conclusive—evidence of higher fertility than the national average, with an established caveat that longer-term convergence is expected ^{[1] [3] [4]}.