How do immigration and birth rates contribute to Muslim population sizes in Europe in 2025?
Executive summary
Europe’s Muslim population is commonly estimated around 46 million (about 6% of ~744–745 million Europeans) in recent 2025 accounts; analysts attribute that growth mainly to immigration (roughly half of post‑2010 growth in some accounts) and to higher fertility among Muslim women compared with non‑Muslims (TFR differences often reported as roughly 1.0 child or more) [1] [2] [3]. Major demographic teams — notably Pew Research and other academic sources cited in the reporting — say fertility gaps are narrowing over time and that migration levels are the decisive variable for near‑term change [2] [4].
1. Immigration: the immediate driver of change
Immigration explains much of the recent rise in Europe’s Muslim numbers. Multiple sources say the wave of migrants since the 2000s — including asylum seekers and labor migrants — accounts for a large share of the increase and remains the principal source of short‑term growth [5] [1]. Analysts and projections emphasize that different migration scenarios produce very different outcomes: Pew’s work models zero, medium and high migration paths for Europe and stresses that migration policy and future crises could materially change trajectories [2] [6]. National differences matter: countries that received large refugee inflows (e.g., Germany, France) show faster recent increases than others [3].
2. Fertility gaps: real now, projected to narrow
Muslim women in Europe currently tend to have higher fertility rates than non‑Muslim women, and that gap amplifies growth even without immigration; reports cite TFRs for Muslim women substantially above the European average — with historical figures ranging from around 2.6 up to 3.1 in country studies — while overall European TFRs sit well below replacement (around 1.5) [1] [7] [2]. Pew and demographic researchers however project that fertility differences will decline as second‑ and third‑generation immigrants adopt host‑country norms, narrowing the gap significantly over decades (projected reduction from about one child per woman today to roughly 0.7 by 2045–50) [2].
3. How immigration and fertility interact
Demographers underline an interaction: immigration supplies a younger, often more male‑skewed cohort that initially lowers births per person (fewer women present), but as migrants settle and family formation follows, births rise; simultaneously, higher Muslim TFRs raise the share of births attributable to Muslims even when their population share is smaller — one source notes Muslims contributing a disproportionate share of births in some countries [1] [4]. Projections therefore depend on both the intensity of continued migration and the pace of fertility convergence. If migration slows, natural increase (births minus deaths) can still produce growth for a time because of younger age structures, but long‑term outcomes hinge on fertility convergence [2].
4. Uncertainties, measurement limits and competing views
Estimating religion by census is uneven across Europe and many countries don’t record religion in official forms, so exact counts vary across sources and methodologies [8]. Some analysts stress that immigrant fertility often falls faster than native rates once migrants settle, producing smaller long‑run effects than headline figures suggest [7]. Conversely, outlets summarizing Pew’s scenarios sometimes frame the baseline as “inevitable” growth even with zero migration; Pew itself cautions that these are conditional scenarios, not forecasts, and that migration and fertility trends could diverge [6] [2].
5. Country variation matters more than continental averages
Aggregate numbers (e.g., ~46 million Muslims in Europe) obscure wide national variation: France, Germany, the UK, Russia and others host large Muslim populations with distinct migration histories and fertility patterns, so national policy, labor markets and crises shape local trajectories far more than pan‑European averages [3] [9]. Reports note that some destination countries are projected to receive fewer Muslim immigrants in 2025–30 than in earlier five‑year blocks, indicating changing flows [4].
6. What this means for 2025 and beyond
For 2025, available reporting indicates that both immigration and higher Muslim birthrates have driven recent increases, but the relative importance of each varies by country and future change will be driven first by migration and second by converging fertility patterns [1] [2] [4]. Policymakers and the public should treat headline continental percentages as tentative: projections hinge on migration policy choices, crises that produce refugees, and the documented tendency of immigrant fertility to fall toward host‑country norms [2] [7]. Available sources do not mention precise 2025 birth‑and‑migration breakdowns for every European country; readers should consult country‑level demographic offices or Pew’s underlying tables for finer detail [2] [4].