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Are Christians or Muslims more frequently targeted by extremists in Nigeria 2020 2024?
Executive Summary
Both Christians and Muslims in Nigeria were repeatedly targeted by extremist violence between 2020 and 2024, and available reporting and datasets do not support a simple claim that one faith was consistently targeted far more than the other across the country; instead, attacks varied by perpetrator, region, and motive, producing different patterns of harm that sometimes disproportionately affected Christians in certain localities and Muslims in others [1] [2] [3]. Multiple authoritative reviews and independent event datasets show significant numbers of victims from both religions and emphasize that the violence’s drivers—insurgent ideology, communal land conflicts involving Fulani herders, and criminal banditry—shape victim selection more than a single nationwide campaign aimed at one religious group [4] [5] [6].
1. What people claimed and why it mattered — the competing narratives that took hold
Public claims framed the violence differently: some U.S. politicians and advocacy groups described the situation as Christians being singled out for mass persecution, while human rights organizations, independent researchers, and multiple government reports framed the crisis as multi-causal violence affecting both Christians and Muslims. The political claims emphasized religious identity and used terms like “Christian genocide,” seeking to elevate the issue on foreign policy agendas, whereas commissions and rights reports stressed complex local drivers—insurgency, pastoralist-farmer conflict, and weak state protection—warning that labeling the violence purely religious risked oversimplifying causes and could skew policy responses [7] [8] [5]. This divergence matters because policy choices—sanctions, designations, or military cooperation—depend on whether violence is framed as systemic religious persecution or as multi-faceted insecurity.
2. What independent data and authoritative reviews actually recorded — numbers and patterns
Independent event datasets and government-commission reports show substantial violence against both faith communities between 2020 and 2024. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Program tallies used in analyses reported hundreds of attacks on Christians and dozens to hundreds on Muslims, with death totals differing by dataset and timeframe but confirming large losses for both groups [5] [2]. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and U.S. State Department reviews described extremist groups attacking churches and mosques, abducting religious leaders, and committing abuses by state forces—concluding that religious freedom was eroded across communities rather than limited to one faith [1] [4] [8]. Differences in counting methods, local identification of victims, and overlaps between criminal and ideological groups produce variation in headline numbers.
3. How different perpetrators shaped who was targeted — motives matter
Perpetrator profiles matter: Boko Haram/ISWAP primarily operate in the northeast with tactics that have impacted predominantly Muslim populations in some attacks, while Fulani-associated armed groups and bandits operating in central states often attacked farming communities that are predominantly Christian, producing localized spikes in Christian victimization [1] [4] [6]. Criminal banditry and communal resource conflicts frequently follow ethnic and livelihood lines rather than explicit religious targeting, although religious identity can correlate with ethnicity and geography and become a marker in tit-for-tat violence. Analysts emphasize that extremist insurgents do not uniformly spare or target either faith; operational goals, local alliances, and strategic calculations determine victims, not a single consistent religious targeting policy [3] [9].
4. Why analyses diverge — data limits, definitions, and political framing
Disagreement among sources stems from three key issues: differences in definitions (what counts as “targeted because of religion”), data completeness (difficulty reliably recording victim religion in remote attacks), and political incentives that shape public claims and reactions. Some studies count attacks on churches and mosques; others attempt to assign victims’ religious identity, producing divergent tallies [2] [6]. Policymakers and activists sometimes emphasize religious framing to mobilize support, while human rights monitors caution that such framing can obscure criminal motives and intra-community dynamics. Reviews by commissions and human rights organizations released through 2024 and early 2025 repeatedly stress methodological uncertainty and advise against definitive national-level claims without caveats [8] [4].
5. Bottom line, evidentiary gaps, and what to watch next
The evidence through 2024 supports the conclusion that both Christians and Muslims suffered frequent extremist attacks, with variation by region and perpetrator rather than a clear, uniform pattern of one religion being far more targeted nationwide [1] [5]. Continued monitoring is necessary because evolving insurgent strategies, population movements, and state responses can change patterns quickly; better granular data on victim identity, motives, and perpetrator attribution would reduce uncertainty. Readers should treat sweeping labels like “genocide” or claims of exclusive targeting with skepticism unless anchored to consistent, transparent datasets and legal analyses, and note that many authoritative reports through 2024 and early 2025 urged precisely this caution [7] [4].