What psychological and social factors make people believe in global conspiracy theories?
Executive summary
Belief in global conspiracy theories is driven by an interplay of psychological needs—fear, a craving for control, cognitive style and personality—and social forces such as institutional mistrust, political polarization and the architecture of modern media that amplifies like-minded networks; these factors combine to make simple, intentional explanations for complex events both attractive and persistent [1] [2] [3]. Scholarship cautions that the phenomenon is not reducible to ignorance or pathology alone: knowledge helps but is neither necessary nor sufficient, and structural conditions like inequality and weak democratic institutions shape susceptibility at scale [4] [3] [5].
1. Psychological comfort: ambiguity, control and existential threat
When the world feels random or threatening people gravitate to narratives that restore order; intolerance of ambiguity and unmet core needs increase the appeal of conspiratorial explanations because they reduce uncertainty and supply a sense of control or purpose in crisis [2] [1]. Research during pandemics and other crises finds that heightened health worries, death anxiety and perceived lack of personal control predict stronger conspiracy endorsement, and that these beliefs can be a coping response to existential threat rather than merely irrational error [1] [6] [7].
2. Cognitive style and biases: thinking fast, distrusting slow thinking
Lower levels of reflective or analytical thinking correlate with faster spread and uptake of conspiracy narratives, while cognitive styles that prefer clear, simple causal stories—combined with common biases like pattern-seeking and confirmation bias—create fertile ground for global conspiracist thinking [3] [4]. Psychometric tools like the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale capture distinct thematic drivers—government malfeasance, information control, malevolent global actors—that align with predictable cognitive patterns rather than idiosyncratic content alone [8].
3. Personality and psychopathology: paranoia, schizotypy and social isolation
Traits associated with paranoia and schizotypy, and experiences such as social isolation, are consistently linked to conspiracy belief; longitudinal work shows that poorer psychological well‑being and psychotic‑like experiences can predict stronger endorsement over time, though scholars debate whether this is a distinct pathology or a continuum of normal cognitive variation [1] [9] [5]. Importantly, these individual vulnerabilities interact with environment: loneliness and confinement during COVID increased susceptibility for many [1].
4. Social identity, resentment and political context
Conspiracy beliefs flourish where people feel alienated, perceive injustice, or belong to groups that experience discrimination; a sense the system is rigged—whether from populist rhetoric or lived exclusion—feeds narratives that powerful elites are secretly plotting, and political polarization magnifies these effects [2] [3] [10]. Cross‑national work shows the “democratic quality” of a country can buffer against science‑related conspiracies, signalling that macro‑political context matters beyond individual cognition [4].
5. Information ecology: social media, alternative media and echo chambers
The rapid, networked spread of misinformation on social platforms and the growth of alternative media create echo chambers that amplify conspiratorial frames and corrode trust in traditional authorities; absence of clear, evidence‑based messaging early in crises worsens the problem by leaving explanatory vacuums that conspiracist content fills [3] [11]. Exposure itself can have a “conspiracy‑effect,” increasing doubt about institutions and lowering compliance with public guidance [9] [7].
6. Trust, institutional failures and structural drivers
Mistrust in government, science and public health—rooted in historical injustices, inequality and poor communication—operates as both cause and consequence of conspiratorial belief: marginalized groups with reasons to distrust authorities are more likely to endorse alternative narratives, and those beliefs then further reduce uptake of protective behaviors like vaccination [3] [6] [12]. Reviews emphasise that these are social problems produced by political and institutional environments as much as by individual vulnerabilities [3] [4].
7. Limits, alternatives and implications for intervention
Scholars warn against medicalizing conspiracy belief: it is often a rational response to perceived injustice or uncertainty rather than pure pathology, and while improving scientific literacy and reflective thinking helps, interventions must also rebuild institutional trust, address inequality and change information architectures that reward sensationalism [5] [4] [7]. Countermeasures recommended in the literature combine clear evidence‑based messaging, social‑psychological inoculation and structural reforms to reduce the drivers that make global conspiracies appealing in the first place [3] [7].