How have public attitudes toward BLM changed since 2020 across different demographic groups?

1. The 2020 spike and the general trajectory since

National polls showed support climbed sharply in mid‑2020—around 60–67% depending on the survey—during the George Floyd protests, then fell from that peak and stabilized at lower levels by 2021–2023, with Pew reporting support at about 51% in 2023 compared with 67% in June 2020 ^{[2] [3]}. Other contemporaneous polls put June 2020 support between roughly 60% and 63% ^{[6] [7]}, and some analyses note that after an initial summer decline support remained relatively steady from late 2020 into 2021 ^[1].

2. Racial differences: strong, stable backing among Black Americans

Black Americans have consistently been the most supportive group: surveys in the aftermath of 2020 show extremely high support among Black respondents (for example, one poll found 82% support) and Pew’s reporting documents much higher endorsement among Black than White adults ^{[8] [2]}. The academic literature also highlights intra‑Black variation—socioeconomic status matters, with lower‑income Black Americans more likely to regard BLM as effective than higher‑income Black Americans, reflecting the movement’s emphasis on centering the most marginalized ^[9].

3. White, Asian and Hispanic Americans: declines and uneven retreat

The decline in aggregate support is driven largely by White Americans: Pew notes White support fell from about 60% in June 2020 to roughly 42% by 2025, with Asian and Hispanic support also dipping but less sharply ^[5]. Overall, surveys since 2020 show a measurable drop in support among non‑Black groups, contributing to a narrower partisan and racial coalition than in the immediate aftermath of Floyd’s murder ^{[5] [3]}.

4. Partisanship, media and polarization

Partisan alignment has intensified: Democrats and left‑leaning media consumers are likelier to hold favorable views of BLM while Republicans and right‑leaning media consumers are more negative, and higher exposure to partisan outlets tends to produce more extreme perceptions of the movement ^[10]. Pew and other polling report that party affiliation explains a large share of the variation in support since 2020, turning what was a more cross‑racial protest moment into a more polarized political issue ^{[3] [5]}.

5. Age, education and the diversity of protest participation

Younger and more educated Americans were overrepresented among 2020 protesters and tend to be more favorable toward BLM, a pattern reinforced by evidence that the 2020 demonstrations were racially and demographically diverse relative to earlier protest waves ^{[11] [10]}. However, actual protest participation remained a small share of the public—only a single‑digit percentage reported attending—so attitudes across age and education groups influence public opinion more than direct protest exposure ^[5].

6. What changed — practically and perceptually — and what didn’t

Empirical work suggests the 2020 protests had limited or geographically constrained effects on measures of racial bias and public opinion, meaning the movement’s visibility did not automatically translate into sustained attitudinal shifts across the country ^[4]. Simultaneously, awareness of discrimination and some policy discussions rose, but many Americans say the increased focus on race has not produced measurable improvements in Black lives, which helps explain waning optimism and declining support ^[3].

7. Competing narratives and hidden agendas

Media framing and political actors have incentives to amplify either the movement’s popularity or its decline: pro‑BLM outlets and scholars emphasize gains in awareness and policy wins, while opponents and some partisan media highlight disorder or declining support to delegitimize the movement—an echo‑chamber dynamic documented in research on partisan media effects ^[10]. Polls themselves vary by question wording and timing, so agendas can shape which numbers gain traction in public debate ^{[2] [10]}.