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What role does terrorism play in perceptions of Islamic violence?
Executive summary
Terrorism—especially jihadist attacks and Islamic State (IS) activity—shapes public perceptions of "Islamic violence" by producing high-profile massacres, inspiring lone actors online, and driving media and political attention; IS affiliates were the deadliest group in 2024–25 and are credited with causing 1,805 deaths in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index summary [1] [2]. Reporting and analysis also show a shift from territorially based insurgencies to dispersed, online-radicalized lone actors, which changes how societies experience and interpret threats [3] [4].
1. Terrorism’s visibility: headline attacks set the public frame
High-lethality, symbolic attacks command news cycles and political debate, concentrating public attention on Islamist-linked terrorism even when its overall frequency fluctuates; for example, CSIS identifies the New Orleans New Year’s Day 2025 truck attack as the deadliest jihadist attack in the U.S. since 2016 and warns it could affect perceived trends [3]. Vision of Humanity’s Global Terrorism Index reports that IS activity caused 1,805 deaths in 2025 and remained the deadliest group globally, reinforcing the narrative that Islamist terrorism is a prominent security problem [1].
2. From hierarchies to networks: how organisational change alters perception
The Islamic State’s territorial caliphate has shrunk, but its model evolved into autonomous regional affiliates and transnational activity—IS-Khorasan and other branches have carried out complex attacks and drawn foreign militants—giving the impression of resilience and global reach even after territorial losses [2] [5]. Security analysts note that decentralised affiliates and franchise-style operations amplify fear because they are harder to dismantle and can appear everywhere at once [2].
3. The online echo chamber: radicalisation that feels immediate and unpredictable
Law-enforcement and intelligence sources emphasise online self-radicalisation and “echo chambers” where individuals consume propaganda, plan, and coordinate remotely; the NYPD and FBI described recent arrests in New Jersey as emblematic of 2025’s social-media-enabled threat [4]. U.S. and foreign officials, including the Director of National Intelligence, have warned that lone wolves radicalised online now form a central part of the threat picture, shifting public perception toward anxiety about random mass-casualty acts [6] [3].
4. Data vs. perception: frequency and lethality diverge
Quantitative studies show nuance: CSIS’s dataset records 740 U.S. attacks and plots through 2025 with 140 labelled jihadist, and it calculates a lower annual death-per-attack rate after 2017—though exceptional attacks can reverse short-term trends [3]. The Global Terrorism Index similarly highlights regional concentration—most IS fatalities are in Syria and the DRC—and reports that many Western fatal attacks in recent years were carried out by lone actors, complicating simplistic narratives [1].
5. Political and media amplification: competing narratives about "mainstreaming"
Some commentators argue that certain political and cultural developments normalise or mainstream sympathy for groups labelled as terrorists; right-leaning outlets and writers have asserted that 2025 marked a mainstreaming of Islamist terrorism imagery in public life [7] [8] [9]. These claims reflect partisan interpretation as much as empirical evidence; available sources do not mention consensus confirmation that such "mainstreaming" is a settled fact beyond the cited opinion pieces [7] [8].
6. Regional variation and humanitarian spillovers: beyond headline violence
UN and Security Council monitoring and forecasts emphasise Africa and the Sahel as regions experiencing expanding terrorist violence with severe displacement and humanitarian consequences, underscoring that "Islamic violence" is not limited to headline attacks in the West but also drives protracted instability and civilian suffering elsewhere [5]. This regional reality can be underreported in countries less affected, skewing global perceptions.
7. What the evidence does and does not say about causes and remedies
Analyses point to several drivers—ideological messaging, online socialisation, decentralised affiliates, and regional grievances—while also noting the limits of current resources and policy responses; CSIS recommends sustained counterterrorism effort but concludes that jihadist terrorism in the U.S. does not currently merit massive reallocation of resources in light of other threats [3]. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism documents IS adaptability and recruitment capacity, suggesting that policy must adapt to networked and online forms of violence [2].
8. Bottom line for readers: perception is shaped by a few deadly events, data and politics
High-profile jihadist attacks and rising affiliate activity make "Islamic violence" salient in public imagination because they are lethal, symbolic, and dramatic; yet datasets and regional reports show a more complex picture of changing frequency, concentration, and modalities [3] [1] [5]. Readers should weigh headline incidents and political commentary against empirical trends reported by security analysts and indexes to avoid overgeneralising from episodic terrorism to a monolithic picture of violence.