How has the South Korean government addressed the low birth rate issue since 2020?

1. A policy pivot from pure cash handouts to structural supports

For years Seoul relied heavily on monetary subsidies and baby bonuses (vouchers of about 2 million won for a first child and 3 million won for subsequent children since April 2022), but both government officials and outside commentators say cash alone has been inadequate; recent official rhetoric emphasizes parental leave expansion, flexible hours, employer incentives and easing education burdens as better long‑term levers ^{[1] [2] [3]}.

2. New institutional architecture: a ministry and high‑level attention

President Yoon framed low fertility as a “national emergency” and proposed creating a Ministry of Low Birth Rate Counter Planning and other senior-level posts to centralize efforts; that plan became a prominent feature of policy debate in 2024–25 even as legislation and office stability faced delays and political disruption ^{[2] [7] [8]}.

3. Work–family reforms: parental leave, flexible work, and employer subsidies

The government has pledged to lengthen paternity leave, raise parental‑leave allowances, expand flexible work options and subsidize firms that hire temporary replacements for parents on leave — measures designed to change workplace norms that currently deter takeup of leave and penalize caregivers ^{[2] [8] [1]}.

4. Childcare, schooling and housing supports to lower the cost of parenting

Policies have broadened to include expanded childcare and after‑school programmes, subsidised housing initiatives for young families, and reduced educational burdens — responses to repeated findings that high housing and education costs drive postponement or avoidance of parenthood ^{[1] [3] [9]}.

5. Fertility treatment and medical support expanded

The government has increased support for fertility treatments and related medical services as part of a broader approach to address low births, an element cited in reporting about policy expansion in 2024–25 ^[10].

6. Results so far: a modest uptick, but causality disputed

Official statistics show a small rise in births and TFR to about 0.75 in 2024 — the first increase in nine years — coinciding with more marriages after COVID‑era postponements; government statements credit policy measures, while analysts caution that the rebound may reflect demographic timing rather than durable policy impact ^{[4] [5] [11]}.

7. Longstanding criticisms: spending large but little effect

Scholars and analysts warn that Korea has already spent large sums (estimates in reporting range into the hundreds of billions of dollars or trillions of won over past decades) with limited long‑term success; reviews argue many measures treat symptoms rather than structural causes like gender inequality, work culture and the hyper‑competitive education system ^{[1] [6] [12]}.

8. Competing interpretations among experts and officials

Some officials and policy teams view the 2024 rise and recent policy tightening as evidence the “policy push” is taking effect, urging filling blind spots (e.g., freelancers, self‑employed) ^[11]. Other experts remain skeptical that population policy alone can materially raise fertility without deeper social change, pointing to persistent barriers such as unequal domestic labor burdens and job insecurity ^{[13] [6] [14]}" target="blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">[14].

**9. Limits of current reporting and what the sources do not say**

Available sources do not provide a comprehensive, audited list of all policy expenditures since 2020 or a causal evaluation attributing birth changes to specific measures; many articles note correlation (policy rollouts and a modest rise) but caution that rigorous impact attribution is not established in the cited reporting ^{[1] [4] [5]}.

10. Bottom line — policy breadth but uncertain long‑term payoff

Since 2020 Seoul broadened its toolkit from cash bonuses to workplace reforms, childcare, housing and fertility support and elevated the issue politically by proposing a new ministry ^{[1] [2] [7]}. Early 2024–25 data show a fragile improvement in births, yet multiple sources stress that without structural shifts — in gender norms, labor practices and education costs — the long‑term demographic trajectory remains uncertain ^{[4] [6] [3]}.