How do crime rates compare between immigrants and native-born residents in the UK since 2010?

Checked on December 10, 2025
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Executive summary

Available UK research since 2010 finds no clear evidence that immigrants commit more crime than native-born once key factors—especially age and socio‑economic status—are controlled for, and several large studies report either no causal link or that higher arrest rates for non‑UK nationals disappear after adjustment [1] [2] [3]. Official statistics and commentators warn the data are limited: there are gaps in measuring immigration status, duration of residence and population denominators, so headline comparisons can be misleading [4] [5].

1. Arrests and raw counts: an incomplete headline

Police and prison statistics often show foreign nationals over‑represented in some datasets (for example, counts of foreign national prisoners or headline numbers of “foreign national offenders”), but these are raw counts, not rates adjusted for population size, age or sex — and the Home Office and ONS acknowledge limits in the data systems that make simple comparisons unreliable [6] [7]. The Migration Observatory stresses that differences in arrest or conviction shares can reflect the make‑up of migrant populations rather than higher offending per person [4].

2. Age structure explains much of the difference

Academic analyses for England and Wales find that apparent higher arrest rates for non‑UK nationals largely vanish once you control for age: immigrants are disproportionately young adults, and crime is higher in those age bands regardless of birthplace — a repeated finding across research from Jaitman, Machin, Bell and colleagues [1] [3]. The LSE work and related papers conclude immigrant criminal behaviour is “comparable to that of natives” after demographic controls [1] [2].

3. Local waves, labour markets and heterogeneity matter

Researchers studying large immigrant inflows (A8 EU migrants and asylum waves) show differing impacts: some waves produced no discernible rise in prison populations, while asylum waves with worse labour market outcomes coincided with small local changes in property crime — indicating context (employment, housing, integration) matters more than migration per se [2] [8]. The Conversation summary highlights employment disadvantage among some refugee cohorts as a plausible mechanism linking certain waves to small crime upticks [9].

4. Measurement problems: what official sources cannot tell you

Multiple expert sources warn that the available statistics do not capture everything needed to compare per‑capita offending by immigration status: there are no reliable, comprehensive denominators for non‑UK populations by status and duration; many data systems don’t record whether an offender still lives in the UK; and victimisation surveys and police records capture different slices of crime [4] [5]. The Home Office says its FNO (foreign national offender) systems have quality issues and that improved reporting is planned [6].

5. Media and political claims often overstate simple comparisons

Recent press and political claims — for example about particular nationalities being “20 times” more criminal — have been challenged by journalists and statisticians as based on underestimates of immigrant population sizes or on flawed comparisons of counts, not rates [10]. Fact‑checking organisations and the ONS/Fulll Fact have repeatedly cautioned against using raw counts without demographic adjustment [11] [12].

6. Two principled interpretations from the evidence

One interpretation, supported by academic panels, is that immigration per se does not raise crime rates: measured differences are largely explained by demographics and local socio‑economic factors, and large migrant inflows have not produced big national crime rises [1] [2] [3]. A competing interpretation — voiced by some advocacy and policy groups — stresses specific risks tied to asylum flows, integration failures and security concerns, urging stricter monitoring and policy responses; this view points to episodic local problems and to limitations in current data that could hide real harms [13] [14].

7. What journalists and policymakers should demand from the statistics

Given the evident data gaps, the responsible course is to demand better denominators by citizenship/immigration status and duration of residence, routine breakdowns by age and sex, and transparency on the distinction between arrests, convictions and victimisation. The Migration Observatory and Home Office both signal these are necessary to move beyond raw counts to meaningful rates [4] [6].

Limitations: available sources do not give a definitive annual time series of per‑capita crime rates for immigrants vs native‑born since 2010; many statements above rely on academic analyses and official caveats in the cited sources [1] [2] [4] [6].

Want to dive deeper?
How have overall crime rates in the UK changed since 2010 and what factors explain the trends?
Which academic studies compare offending rates of different immigrant groups versus native-born residents in the UK since 2010?
How do crime types (violent, property, fraud) differ between immigrants and native-born populations in the UK?
What role do socioeconomic factors (employment, housing, education) play in explaining crime disparities between immigrants and native-born residents?
How have UK policing practices, immigration enforcement, and data collection changed since 2010 and affected crime statistics for immigrants?