How do demographics (age, birth rate, migration) of the UK Muslim population compare with the national averages?
Executive summary
The Muslim population in Britain is growing faster than the national average and was reported at around 6% of the population in a recent Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) summary of 2021 Census data; between 2011 and 2021 Muslims accounted for 32% of the country’s population growth according to MCB analysis [1] [2]. Available sources highlight three demographic drivers: a younger age profile, higher birth rates, and immigration/displaced-person arrivals — all cited by MCB reporting and commentary [2] [3].
1. Younger age profile — the demographic engine
The MCB’s summary and accompanying reporting stress that British Muslims are substantially younger, which drives higher natural increase (births minus deaths) relative to the national average; that younger profile is repeatedly flagged as a principal reason for the community’s rapid growth between census rounds [2]. Detailed age-structure tables are not reproduced in the provided summary, so exact median-age comparisons with the whole‑population are not found in current reporting [1] [2].
2. Fertility and birth rates — higher births per woman than average
MCB analysis attributes a meaningful portion of Muslim population growth to higher birth rates, noting that between 2011 and 2021 the Muslim population increased by 1.2 million and accounted for nearly a third (32%) of the decade’s population rise — a pattern consistent with above-average fertility [2]. The specific fertility rate numbers (for example, total fertility rate for Muslims versus national TFR) are not published in the MCB summary or the linked reporting available here; those precise rates are therefore not found in current reporting [2] [1].
3. Migration and arrivals — immigration and displaced persons matter
MCB reporting explicitly lists immigration and the arrival of displaced persons (from conflict and climate-related displacement) as a contributor to recent Muslim population growth in Britain [2]. The MCB’s census summary and related articles present migration as one of several drivers but do not provide a detailed breakdown of net migration by religion in the excerpts provided; the Office for National Statistics data release on Muslim population by ethnicity exists but is a separate dataset and its detailed figures were not quoted in the MCB summary text available here [2] [4].
4. Geographic concentration and socio‑economic context
The MCB summary flags strong geographic clustering: it quotes that 68% of Muslims in England and Wales live in areas with high unemployment, a point raised by the MCB Secretary General and used to underline socio‑economic challenges that accompany demographic growth [3]. That concentration amplifies local demographic impacts — faster school enrolment growth, differing labour-market pressures and service demands — but the MCB summary does not supply nationally comparable unemployment figures for non-Muslims within the same excerpt [3].
5. Growth in historical perspective and long‑run projections — competing viewpoints
Beyond the Census summary, independent projection work cited in the materials suggests much larger long‑term increases: one projection claims the Muslim share could rise from about 7% in 2025 to 11.2% by 2050 and approach 19.2% by 2100 [5]. That projection reflects particular assumptions on fertility, migration and identity; it contrasts with the MCB’s near‑term use of census growth to describe current influence and challenges [2] [5]. Both sources point to growth but differ on timeframe and assumptions — readers should note that long‑range projections are highly sensitive to migration and fertility assumptions [5].
6. What the official stats can and cannot tell us
The Office for National Statistics holds detailed tables (including a Muslim population by ethnicity file) that can deliver the granular breakdowns needed to compare age‑structure, fertility and migration directly against national averages, but those datasets were not quoted in detail in the MCB summary excerpts provided here [4] [1]. Therefore, this analysis relies on MCB summaries and reporting for headline claims; for precise rates (median age, TFR, net migration volumes by religion) readers should consult the full ONS releases referenced [4].
7. Implications and contested narratives
The reporting frames Muslim demographic growth as both an indicator of growing political and social influence and as a source of stress for public services and labour markets in concentrated areas [2] [3]. That framing carries implicit agendas: advocacy groups emphasize representation and resource needs, while projection authors may highlight long‑term cultural change. The available sources present these competing emphases rather than a single consensus [2] [5].
Limitations: This article uses only the provided sources; detailed numerical comparisons (exact median ages, fertility rates, or migration flows by religion) are not contained in the excerpts and so are not asserted here — the ONS datasets cited would be the next step for those precise figures [4].