What projections exist for the UK Muslim population share based on current fertility and migration trends?
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Executive summary
Official 2021 census material compiled by the Muslim Council of Britain puts the UK Muslim population at roughly 4 million, about 6% of the population, and highlights a young age profile that will age over time [1] [2]. Independent projections vary: a heterodox academic projection forecasts growth from about 7% in 2025 to 11.2% by 2050 and roughly 19.2% by 2100 under its baseline assumptions [3], while Pew Research’s 2017 scenarios produced a narrower 2050 range — roughly 12.7% under zero migration and 17.2% under high migration [4].
1. Census today: the baseline and the age profile
The most immediate empirical anchor is the 2021 census summary compiled by the Muslim Council of Britain, which reports around 4 million Muslims in the UK, about 6% of the population, with most concentrated in England [1] [2]. That report also stresses that Muslim communities are relatively young now but cautions their age structure will converge toward the national profile in time, implying fertility-driven growth will moderate as cohorts age [1].
2. Academic long-run projection: steady rise to the late-century
A heterodox demographic projection, which explicitly lays out its assumptions in an appendix, maps a sustained increase in Muslim share from 7% in 2025 to 11.2% by 2050, 15.2% by 2075 and 19.2% by 2100 — nearly one in five people by the end of the century under that model’s scenario [3]. That projection combines fertility differences, migration flows and intergenerational dynamics to produce long-term momentum; its authors acknowledge the result depends heavily on their chosen assumptions [3].
3. Scenario-based outlook: migration swings the mid-century outcome
Pew Research’s scenario exercise from 2017 offers a useful contrast for mid-century expectations: with no future migration, it projected a UK Muslim population of about 6.56 million (12.7%) by 2050, while a high migration scenario produced about 13.48 million (17.2%) in 2050 — demonstrating that migration assumptions materially change the 2050 share [4]. Those two scenarios bracket plausible mid-century results and underscore that migration policy and global mobility are first-order determinants of the Muslim share by 2050 [4].
4. Why fertility and migration matter — and where uncertainty sits
Projections are driven by three observable mechanisms flagged across sources: younger average age and higher fertility among Muslim communities (which raises short-term growth potential) [1], continuing inflows and the size of second-generation populations (heterodox work emphasizes the growing foreign-born plus second-generation share) [3], and countervailing forces such as fertility convergence and changing migration regimes that models must assume explicitly [3] [4]. The heterodox paper and Pew both make clear that different, plausible assumption sets yield materially different trajectories, so projections are conditional forecasts not inexorable destinies [3] [4].
5. Reading the divergences: method, assumptions and politics
Differences between the heterodox projection, Pew scenarios and headline census figures reflect method and choice: census provides a contemporary snapshot; Pew offers scenario bounds for mid-century that hinge on migration; the heterodox paper presents a single long-run trajectory under specified assumptions [1] [3] [4]. Each source has an implicit agenda of emphasis — community groups highlight present-day demographics and service needs [2], academics model long-term societal composition [3], and research centers like Pew supply policy-relevant scenarios [4]. Readers should treat projections as tools to explore plausible futures rather than precise predictions.