Why Syrians hate Kurds so much? I want to understand the rage of last days
Executive summary
The recent surge of anger and violence between Syrians and Kurds is rooted less in sudden mass hatred than in a decade of competing governance projects, shifting alliances, and local grievances—especially the Kurdish project of autonomy (Rojava), its security forces (the SDF/YPG), and the Syrian central government’s drive to reassert control [1] [2] [3]. Fast-moving battlefield reversals, tribal defections from the SDF and government narratives portraying Kurdish autonomy as a challenge to Syrian unity have amplified mistrust and produced the visible “rage of the last days” [4] [5] [6].
1. Autonomy versus unity: a political clash dressed as ethnic grievance
What many observers describe as ethnic hatred is in large part a dispute over political order: Kurdish-led institutions in northeast Syria sought autonomous civil and military structures after 2011, which put them at odds with Damascus’s insistence on a unitary state; the recent government advance aims to dissolve those separate structures and integrate fighters individually into the army, a major point of friction [1] [2] [3].
2. Local grievances and governance failures that fueled resentment
Beyond high politics, Arab tribes and some local communities chafed under Kurdish-dominated administration in mixed areas—complaints over governance, alleged abuses by local commanders, and disputes over land and property created real antagonism that the Syrian government exploited to peel Arabs away from the SDF alliance [4] [7] [8].
3. The SDF’s multiethnic claim and its limits in practice
The Syrian Democratic Forces presented themselves as a multiethnic bloc that fought ISIS and built civic institutions, yet analysts and local reports point to instances where Kurdish authorities discriminated against minorities (e.g., Assyrians) or empowered problematic commanders—these gaps between ideology and on-the-ground practice helped opponents portray Kurds as a sectarian or self-interested authority rather than inclusive partners [1] [4].
4. External patrons, shifting alliances and the politics of abandonment
U.S. backing of Kurdish-led forces against ISIS was a double-edged sword: it strengthened Kurdish autonomy but also painted the SDF as reliant on foreign protection; recent U.S. realignments and transfers of detainees have left Kurdish forces exposed, which both heightened Kurdish fear of reprisal and allowed Damascus to claim it was restoring sovereignty—fuel for popular anger on all sides [9] [10] [11].
5. Battlefield shocks, tribal defections, and the “rage” narrative
The lightning government advances and sudden defections of Arab tribal fighters who had once been allied with the SDF produced scenes of collapse and humiliation for many Kurds and relief or celebration among some Arab Syrians who saw reunification as justice or stability; those rapid shifts hardened attitudes and turned political disputes into communal anger and retribution fears [5] [12] [6].
6. Propaganda, disinformation and competing agendas
All sides run information campaigns: Damascus frames the takeover as reunification and legal integration with cultural concessions, while Kurdish leaders stress betrayal and risk to civilian Kurds; international think tanks warn of mutual disinformation and the humanitarian risks of renewed fighting—these layered narratives are pushed by actors with clear agendas (government consolidation, Kurdish survival, foreign policy signaling) and intensify impression of popular “hate” even when motivations are mixed [8] [13] [14].
7. What the current moment actually reflects and what remains unknown
The visible fury of recent days reflects a combustible mix of local grievances, political contestation over autonomy, battlefield dynamics, and external abandonment; reporting shows mass territorial change, ceasefires that fold Kurdish autonomy into state structures, and deep Kurdish anxieties—but available sources do not provide a single explanation for mass public attitudes across all Syrian communities, and local variations matter greatly [3] [15] [7].