What is the public record on Carbyne’s investors and ties to UAE and Israeli officials referenced in the leaked emails?

Checked on January 25, 2026
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Executive summary

Leaked emails from former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak’s inbox and reporting by outlets aggregating those leaks show Jeffrey Epstein promoted and financed Reporty (now Carbyne) and used Barak’s network to pitch the company to powerful investors, while Carbyne’s public investor and advisory lists include Israeli security figures and at least one prominent UAE-linked name; independent confirmation of operational uses of Carbyne in UAE infrastructure or direct Emirati state investment beyond listed links is limited in the public record [1] [2] [3]. The leaks have reignited scrutiny of Carbyne’s ties to Israeli security elites and to Emirati elites, but several claims in the broader narrative—such as assertions that Epstein was a paid Israeli intelligence asset or that Carbyne was covertly embedded in UAE port systems—remain contested or unproven in the sources provided [4] [5].

1. The core documentary trail: leaked Barak emails, DDoSecrets and Dropsite reporting

A large tranche of Barak’s emails, posted by DDoSecrets and reported by outlets like Reason and Dropsite News, documents Epstein’s role promoting Reporty/Carbyne and arranging investor meetings in the mid‑2010s, showing direct outreach to tech investors and foreign officials that included pitches for the company and introductions to people such as Peter Thiel’s associates [1] [6]. Those primary‑source leaks are the foundation of journalistic reconstructions that link Epstein, Barak, and Carbyne in business development efforts [1] [2].

2. Who publicly invested in or associated with Carbyne?

Public investor filings and contemporaneous reporting show that U.S. venture firms tied to Peter Thiel (Founders Fund/Valar) participated in Carbyne financing rounds, and Carbyne’s own materials and press stories have listed high‑profile backers and advisors from the national‑security world, including former U.S. homeland‑security officials and Israeli security operatives [1] [2]. Reporting also notes that Carbyne’s website displayed Yousef Al Otaiba, the UAE ambassador to Washington, on an investors page—an explicit public linkage to an Emirati official that has been highlighted in secondary reporting [3].

3. UAE links cited in the leaks: interest, introductions, and post‑Accords investment claims

Leaked correspondence and follow‑up reporting allege Epstein arranged meetings between Barak and Emirati figures—most prominently Dubai/DP World executives such as Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem—and that in 2018 bin Sulayem showed interest in Carbyne, according to Dropsite and related coverage; some reports further say Carbyne later received Emirati‑linked investment after normalization between the UAE and Israel [7] [3] [5]. The public record in the sources confirms expressions of interest and introductions in emails, and the presence of at least one UAE‑linked name on Carbyne’s investors page, but does not provide a transparent, independently audited ledger of complete Emirati state investment in Carbyne [3] [5].

4. Israeli security ties and political leadership involvement

Carbyne was co‑founded and later chaired by Ehud Barak, and reporting repeatedly emphasizes the company’s staffing and advisory connections to former Unit 8200 operatives and other Israeli security figures, which has driven concerns about dual‑use surveillance capabilities and national‑security linkages [2] [4]. The leaks show Barak using his platform to solicit partners and investors for Reporty/Carbyne; these are documented in the hacked email corpus and widely cited in subsequent investigative pieces [1] [6].

5. Claims, denials, and limits of the public record

Some outlets and commentators have extrapolated from the emails to allege espionage, kompromat operations or secret embedding of Carbyne systems in UAE ports; those are stronger claims than the documents themselves demonstrate. Sources note critics’ concerns about backdoors and surveillance potential [4], while other pieces report denials—publicly and by intermediaries—about formal intelligence control, and the provided materials do not contain incontrovertible evidence that Carbyne was used as a covert intelligence pipeline into UAE state infrastructure [4] [5]. The leaks document introductions, pitches, investments and public investor listings, but independent verification of secret contracts, covert operational use, or payments by specific UAE state entities is not established in the available sources [1] [3] [5].

6. What the pattern suggests and why it matters

Taken together, the public record in the leaked emails and reporting shows a pattern: Epstein capitalized on personal access to promote an Israeli emergency‑communications startup; that startup attracted Western venture capital and listed at least one UAE‑linked figure among its public contacts; and the company’s Israeli security pedigree has made any Gulf connections politically sensitive—especially after the Abraham Accords accelerated commercial ties—yet the record stops short of proving covert intelligence transfers or confirmed state procurement of Carbyne for critical UAE infrastructure within the materials cited here [1] [2] [3] [5].

Want to dive deeper?
What contracts or procurement records show Carbyne systems being purchased or deployed by UAE government entities?
What specific evidence do the leaked Barak emails provide about financial transfers related to Reporty/Carbyne?
How have privacy and law‑enforcement groups evaluated Carbyne’s technology and data‑access mechanisms?