Two months ago, Chinese researchers published exactly how to black out Starlink over Taiwan: 935 coordinated ground-based jammers blanketing Ku-band frequencies.
Executive summary
The core of the claim is grounded in real reporting: Chinese researchers published a simulation in November 2025 that models how a distributed jamming campaign could suppress Starlink coverage over an area the size of Taiwan and identifies a minimum-grid solution of roughly 935 high‑power jamming nodes under ideal conditions [1] [2] [3]. However, the claim’s specifics—“ground‑based” jammers and explicit “Ku‑band” targeting—are not supported by the available reporting, which emphasizes airborne platforms, a range of node estimates (935 up to 2,000), and simulation assumptions rather than a proven operational blueprint [4] [5] [6].
1. What the paper actually says and who wrote it
The research, published in a Chinese peer‑reviewed venue and led by teams from Zhejiang University and the Beijing Institute of Technology, used real Starlink orbital data to run dynamic 12‑hour simulations of downlink coverage and modeled both wide‑ and narrow‑beam jammers; their narrow‑beam scenario used a 26 dBW jammer spaced roughly 7 km apart and produced a minimum estimate of about 935 coordinated jamming nodes to blanket Taiwan’s area under ideal conditions [1] [7] [8]. Multiple outlets reporting on the study also cite broader ranges—commonly 1,000–2,000 airborne devices—depending on power, redundancy and weather/terrain assumptions [5] [4] [6].
2. Technical feasibility: simulation versus reality
The paper demonstrates technical plausibility in a model: a dense, synchronized grid of jammers could, in simulation, deny Starlink downlink service across a large footprint by overwhelming or corrupting user links, accounting for Starlink’s frequency hopping and mesh‑like handoffs [9] [10]. But simulations assume idealized conditions—perfect synchronization, no contested airspace, and no active defensive measures—and do not prove field‑scale effectiveness; reporters and analysts uniformly caveat that real‑world performance would be degraded by terrain, atmospheric effects, node failures and the constellation operator’s software/hardware countermeasures [9] [2] [10].
3. The “ground‑based Ku‑band” assertion and platform realities
Contrary to the user’s phrasing, the publications and reporting emphasize airborne jammers—drones, balloons or aircraft operating at high altitude (reports mention ~20 km in the model)—rather than strictly ground‑based fixed stations, because airborne platforms better create the required three‑dimensional coverage and line‑of‑sight to fast low‑Earth orbit satellites [6] [7] [3]. The articles reference jammer power and beamwidth (26 dBW narrow beam cited) but do not consistently identify a single frequency band such as Ku‑band in the reporting excerpts provided; outlets focus on the challenge of jamming rapidly switching low‑Earth‑orbit links rather than naming a single target band [1] [8] [9].
4. Operational, political and countermeasure constraints
Executing such a campaign would be immense: deploying hundreds to thousands of high‑altitude, synchronized jamming platforms in contested airspace exposes them to Taiwan’s air defenses and logistical limits, and the cost, coordination and attrition rates could be prohibitive [5] [4]. Additionally, SpaceX/Starlink has demonstrated rapid constellation and software responses to jamming in Ukraine, and operators can reconfigure frequencies, beamforming and handoffs—factors the Chinese researchers acknowledge as complicating sustained suppression [4] [10]. Journalistic and expert coverage therefore frames the study as a technical vignette of what might be attempted, not an operational manual guaranteed to work in war [2] [9].
5. Strategic signaling and why this matters
The publication serves dual purposes: it maps a theoretical capability while signaling to domestic and foreign audiences that Chinese researchers and defense institutions are thinking hard about countering commercial LEO services, and it highlights gaps and resource thresholds for any actor contemplating such an operation [11] [12]. Independent outlets and analysts stress that the study raises legitimate strategic concerns about dependence on commercial constellations in war but also that the political and military hurdles—scale, survivability, and adversary countermeasures—make the scenario costly and uncertain [4] [10].
Bottom line: the headline claim is partly true—the study published by Chinese researchers models a scenario that yields a ~935‑node minimum in an idealized narrow‑beam case—but it overstates certainty by calling the plan “ground‑based,” specifying Ku‑band without corroboration, and implying a turnkey operational capability; reporting uniformly treats the work as a large‑scale simulation with significant caveats about real‑world effectiveness and countermeasures [1] [5] [2].