Are CSAM uploaders to image hosts, file archive sites (like mega, daofiles, emload etc), or their csam file downloaders focused on more?
Executive summary
The available reporting shows that CSAM actors who use open image hosts and file-archive services pursue overlapping objectives—distribution to peer networks, long-term storage/collection, evasion of takedown and law enforcement, and sexual gratification—rather than a single singular motive [1] [2]. Platforms that permit anonymous, large-file uploads enable rapid sharing and scale, which drives both mass redistribution and the maintenance of extensive caches for repeat consumption and trafficking [1] [3].
1. Distribution and amplification are primary, but not exclusive, goals
A central function of image hosts and anonymous file services is to make material easy to share: the Justice Department notes services that let users upload without accounts and with generous file-size limits become prolific delivery mechanisms for offenders sharing CSAM, which highlights distribution as a clear, primary aim [1]. NCMEC’s CyberTipline data also show massive numbers of reports tied to uploads, and its role as a reporting hub underscores that platforms are used at scale largely for dissemination across networks and jurisdictions [3] [4].
2. Collection and private consumption drive continued storage on hosting services
Beyond immediate sharing, offenders store large media collections remotely because convenient, persistent access fuels repeat viewing and curation of collections; DOJ reporting links platform features—large size caps, no-registration uploads—to the ability to host millions of images or videos and thwart domestic investigations [1]. Academic and law-enforcement literature further documents that many users remain undetected and that vast caches accumulate on the dark and clear web alike, indicating compulsive collection and private consumption are substantial motives [5] [6].
3. Evasion of detection and legal barriers shape platform choice
Technical and legal constraints steer offenders toward certain hosts: encrypted devices, warrant-proof storage, ephemeral apps, and services with poor data-retention or weak preservation compliance create barriers for investigators, per DOJ technology analysis, which explains why perpetrators prefer hosts that complicate identification and preservation of evidence [1]. Lawfare analysis stresses the need for enrichment of CyberTipline reports—such as identifying IP addresses tied to peer‑to‑peer sharing—to triage threats, implying offender behavior is calibrated to exploit investigative blind spots [7].
4. Community dynamics, status, and exploitation magnify behavior on hosting sites
Reports describe online communities that trade technical advice, legitimize interest, and gamify sharing—seeking likes, followers, or reputational gain—so psychological drivers like ego and power combine with technical methods to motivate uploads and sharing [2] [8]. These community incentives coexist with predatory tactics such as sextortion and threats to victims, which motivate offenders to upload or threaten distribution as a tool of control [2].
5. Monetization and trafficking exist but vary by platform and network
While explicit sales and organized trafficking are documented—investigations and FBI task forces target networks that manufacture, trade, and sell CSAM—the extent to which simple image hosts are used for direct commercial transactions versus free peer exchange depends on the service’s architecture and user base [9] [1]. DOJ and EU analyses note some file-hosting services have been used to move large collections and support criminal networks, but the sources do not quantify how often monetization is the primary motive on every hosting site [1] [8].
6. Law enforcement and reporting structures shape what we see in the data, creating detection bias
The scale of reported uploads—millions of CyberTipline reports—reflects both the prevalence of sharing and reporting obligations placed on U.S. providers, but NCMEC’s own data show 84% of reports in 2024 originated outside the U.S., and many industry-submitted reports lack adequate location data, meaning observable patterns are influenced by who reports and what platforms cooperate [3]. Existing statutes do not require affirmative scanning by all providers, and privacy debates (e.g., cloud-scanning controversies) complicate the visibility of CSAM activity, leaving gaps in understanding offender priorities where data are thin [10] [8].
Conclusion: multifaceted motives tuned to platform affordances
Taken together, the evidence supports a nuanced answer: uploaders and downloaders use image hosts and file-archive sites for multiple, overlapping purposes—rapid mass dissemination, building and consuming archives, evading detection, community status, and sometimes monetization—with the relative emphasis varying by offender, platform features, and legal/technical restraints; the public record documents these patterns but cannot fully measure each actor’s inner motives or frequency across all services [1] [2] [5].