Does north korea has any issues with internet connection and cellular network because of sanctions?
Executive summary
North Korea’s public internet and cross-border telephony remain tightly restricted by the state, not primarily by sanctions; ordinary citizens largely use a national intranet (Kwangmyong) and a monitored mobile system with limited or no access to the global Internet [1] [2]. External sanctions and recent U.S. actions have targeted DPRK financial and IT networks used for cybercrime and sanctions evasion, which complicate the regime’s ability to move money and procure some foreign IT services — but available reporting shows domestic connectivity limits are driven first by political control and infrastructure choices, with sanctions affecting financial/technology channels rather than directly turning citizens offline [3] [4] [5] [6].
1. How North Koreans actually connect: a closed intranet, managed mobile networks
Most ordinary citizens do not have normal global Internet access; they use a domestic intranet called Kwangmyong and state-operated mobile services (Koryolink, Kangsong NET/Byol) that provide bounded content and are subject to heavy surveillance and restrictions [1] [7] [8]. Data compilation efforts say the “internet — at least as the rest of the world knows it — remains unavailable to everyday citizens” and GSMA Intelligence counted roughly 7.31 million mobile connections at the start of 2025, reflecting internal use rather than open web access [2] [1].
2. Outages happen — but causes vary (and are often not public)
North Korea has experienced full-country outages of its externally accessible websites and network links — researchers tracking the DPRK internet reported a major outage in June 2025 when the nation’s external infrastructure “is not registering” on global monitors [9]. Historic outages have had varied explanations in outside reporting, including DDoS attacks in 2022 and intermittent technical failures; public sources do not attribute all outages to sanctions [9] [1]. Available sources do not mention a definitive pattern that sanctions directly cause recurrent nationwide connectivity blackouts.
3. Sanctions target DPRK cyber and financial enablers, not ordinary users’ phones
Recent U.S. Treasury and Justice Department measures (summer–autumn 2025) focus on disrupting money laundering, cryptocurrency theft, and remote IT worker schemes that fund the regime’s weapons programs; OFAC and DOJ targeted individuals, banks and IT companies involved in those revenue streams [3] [10] [5]. Those actions make it harder for Pyongyang to use international financial rails, shell firms and foreign-based banking proxies — an economic and operational pressure, not a direct technical cut to domestic Internet or cell service inside North Korea [3] [11].
4. Sanctions can indirectly affect technology procurement and service resilience
While sanctions do not appear to be used as blunt instruments to disable citizens’ connectivity, they can constrain the regime’s ability to buy new equipment, services or foreign maintenance through legal and banking choke points. OFAC listings explicitly name DPRK IT firms and financial facilitators, which raises costs and friction for procurement and movement of revenue tied to IT activity [12] [5]. Analysts also note North Korea’s reliance on secondhand foreign gear (often Chinese) for mobile upgrades; that procurement model creates limits to coverage and resilience independent of sanctions [13] [14].
5. The regime’s surveillance and technical controls are the primary limits on access
Reporting emphasizes that censorship, state monitoring and bespoke phone firmware block or neuter ordinary Internet features (e.g., Wi‑Fi icons that do nothing) and restrict access to foreign sites; technical measures (spectrum analyzers, border detectors) and policy choices are used to prevent unauthorized international comms and to detect cross-border phone usage [15] [16]. This suggests political control, not sanctions per se, explains why citizens cannot freely use global Internet services [15] [16].
6. Competing viewpoints and key uncertainties
U.S. and allied publications frame sanctions as essential to cutting DPRK illicit revenue streams and thereby constraining cyber operations [3] [4]. Some telecom-technology reporting stresses that North Korea’s connectivity is limited by aging or secondhand infrastructure and by practical limits of coverage [13]. What is not settled in the available reporting is a clear chain-of-causation from sanctions to everyday blackouts or loss of mobile service for citizens; sources do not document sanctions being used as the proximate cause of domestic connectivity outages (available sources do not mention sanctions directly causing nationwide outages).
7. Bottom line for the original question
Do sanctions make North Koreans lose Internet or cellular service? The evidence shows sanctions mainly aim at DPRK financial networks, cyber operators, and IT firms that enable illicit revenue flows — they complicate procurement and cross-border transactions but are not documented as directly cutting ordinary citizens’ mobile or intranet access. Instead, domestic censorship, surveillance, and reliance on limited/secondhand infrastructure are the primary drivers of restricted Internet and cellular experiences inside the country [3] [5] [1] [13].