Have independent audits or privacy researchers published telemetry analyses of DuckDuckGo’s extensions across browsers?
Executive summary
Independent security researchers and at least one named privacy researcher have published analyses alleging that DuckDuckGo’s browser products transmit telemetry or data flows to Microsoft-owned domains, and critics and “external auditors” cited in reporting claim those analyses reveal exceptions to DuckDuckGo’s tracker-blocking claims [1]. However, the available reporting conflates analyses of the DuckDuckGo Privacy Browser and broader “extensions” and does not provide a clear, peer-reviewed catalogue of cross‑browser extension telemetry studies, so the claim that independent audits have comprehensively analyzed DuckDuckGo’s extensions across all major browsers is not fully supported by the single source provided [1].
1. What the reporting actually shows about telemetry analyses
The source attributes a “breakthrough” analysis to privacy researcher Zach Edwards that inspected browser data flows and concluded DuckDuckGo’s Privacy Browser sent information to Microsoft domains such as Bing and LinkedIn, a finding characterized as a surprise by other security commentators and described as evidence of a “hidden data practice” [1]. That reporting further claims “external auditors” and “independent security audits” corroborated that DuckDuckGo made an exception allowing Microsoft’s tracking system to operate despite promises to block third‑party trackers, presenting these as telemetry or flow analyses that challenge DuckDuckGo’s privacy claims [1].
2. Limits in the public record: browser app vs. cross‑browser extensions
The available account mixes observations about the DuckDuckGo Privacy Browser app and broader language about extensions without producing a public, methodical audit matrix of telemetry across Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Safari and other extension ecosystems; the cited pieces describe data‑flow discoveries but do not publish a comprehensive, independent dataset showing identical telemetry behaviors across each browser’s extension builds [1]. In short, the source supports that independent researchers analyzed DuckDuckGo’s product and reported Microsoft‑domain flows, but it does not prove that formal, multi‑browser telemetry audits—published and reproducible—exist for every DuckDuckGo extension [1].
3. Who is doing the analyzing, and what are their incentives
The reporting names privacy researcher Zach Edwards as a central figure and references commentary from security practitioners like Roger Grimes, and also references “external auditors” and “independent security audits” without linking to full audit reports or detailed methodologies in the excerpt provided; these actors may have privacy‑advocacy or commercial incentives to publicize findings, and DuckDuckGo has a strong brand interest in minimizing reputational damage, which creates asymmetric incentives in public statements [1]. The source frames some findings as a “shock” to DuckDuckGo’s privacy reputation, signaling that the coverage tilts toward highlighting surprises and potential misalignment between marketing and telemetry practices [1].
4. Contradictions and missing documentation that matter
The reporting simultaneously claims that “independent security audits confirmed” certain exceptions and that DuckDuckGo “never went through a formal privacy audit,” which is a contradictory pair that underlines the absence of transparent, standardized audit reports in the public domain attached to these allegations [1]. The lack of linked, reproducible telemetry logs, audit methodologies, or vendor responses in the excerpt prevents a definitive, evidence‑based statement that auditors have completed cross‑browser extension telemetry analyses to an industry standard [1].
5. How to interpret the state of evidence and next steps for verification
Given the source, the prudent conclusion is that independent researchers and auditors have published analyses alleging telemetry flows from DuckDuckGo products to Microsoft domains and raising questions about exceptions to tracker blocking, but that the provided reporting does not constitute a comprehensive, peer‑reviewed set of telemetry audits of DuckDuckGo browser extensions across all browsers; verifying that broader claim requires published audit reports, raw telemetry dumps, or reproducible test suites showing consistent behavior in each browser’s extension [1]. Readers and researchers should demand linked methodologies, vendor comment from DuckDuckGo, and corroborating analyses from multiple independent labs before treating the cross‑browser extension question as settled [1].