What does DuckDuckGo’s official privacy policy and technical documentation say about local data storage?
Executive summary
DuckDuckGo’s official materials consistently state that some data is stored locally on users’ devices for functionality and anonymity — for example, display settings, dismissed prompts, and subscription details are kept locally rather than on DuckDuckGo’s servers [1] [2]. The company frames this local storage as privacy-preserving, emphasizes that servers do not retain identifying data like IP addresses for location-based results, and provides on-device controls such as a “Fire Button” to clear local data while also documenting limits and bugs [3] [4] [5].
1. What DuckDuckGo says: local storage is intentional and limited
DuckDuckGo’s privacy policy explicitly notes the use of local storage on a device to remember anonymous display settings and to avoid repeatedly showing dismissed prompts, framing these uses as anonymous and user-friendly rather than server-side tracking [1]. The help pages repeat that local storage is used to remember things like dismissed app install prompts and explain that optional features that require personal information use “only the minimal necessary storage” [5] [1]. The Subscription policy goes further in a concrete example, stating that subscription-related details such as name, age, and address are stored locally on the user’s device and not on DuckDuckGo servers [2].
2. On-device privacy controls and clearing local data
DuckDuckGo promotes on-device controls to manage local data, including a Fire Button designed to “burn” recent on-device browsing data in one click and a Fireproofing option that preserves first-party cookies and storage for sites the user chooses to keep signed in [4] [5]. The company is transparent about a specific WebView2 bug that can temporarily prevent the Fire Button from instantly clearing fragments of browsing data, and it advises users to restart the browser as a workaround until the upstream bug is resolved [5].
3. Anonymity claims tied to local-first approach and server handling
For localized search results, DuckDuckGo describes a GEO::IP lookup process whereby the IP address is used to guess location and then immediately discarded, with the company asserting it does not save the IP address on its servers — a practice presented as complementary to local storage to avoid building user profiles server-side [3]. Across its help pages and policy language, the company emphasizes not tracking searches or retaining browsing history on servers as core principles of its model [4] [3].
4. Third-party summaries and potential user risks
Privacy-focused summaries and third-party reviews echo DuckDuckGo’s core stance that the service avoids server-side tracking while noting that devices nevertheless retain local artifacts; PrivacyHawk paraphrases that device-sent information is used temporarily and not stored alongside user profiles, and Surfshark warns that local device storage means an attacker with device access could still find browsing data [6] [7]. These third-party takes reveal the implicit trade-off: reducing centralized data collection can shift some privacy responsibility back to device security [7] [6].
5. Business framing and hidden incentives
DuckDuckGo repeatedly positions local storage practices within a broader privacy-friendly business model, stating revenue comes from “privacy-respecting” search ads rather than exploiting personal data, which aligns with its narrative that minimizing server-side storage is a privacy advantage [4] [6]. That framing serves both product design and marketing goals; independent observers caution that emphasizing local storage and anonymity can obscure practical limits, such as the need to store some subscription data locally or to rely on third-party components like WebView2 whose bugs may affect clearing behavior [2] [5].
6. What official sources do not (clearly) disclose
DuckDuckGo’s materials make clear where local storage is used and assert anonymization or non-retention server-side, but the cited documents do not provide exhaustive technical details on encryption standards for local storage, exact retention windows on devices, or forensic recoverability of locally stored artifacts — limitations that the official pages do not fully quantify [1] [2] [5]. Where external reviewers note device-side risks, the company’s documents do not furnish independent verification or deep technical audits within the cited texts [6] [7].