Which messaging apps offer end-to-end encryption for chats between users in Russia and Europe?

1. Which popular apps provide end‑to‑end encryption by default — and which do not

Signal and WhatsApp are E2E encrypted by default for messages between users; both use the Signal protocol (Signal directly and WhatsApp with variations) and are widely cited as offering unrecoverable E2E protection for message content ^{[1] [3]}. By contrast, Telegram’s default chats are not E2E; only “secret” one‑to‑one chats and voice calls use E2E encryption, so ordinary cloud chats are not inherently protected end‑to‑end ^{[7] [1]}. Several privacy‑focused alternatives recommended in 2025 — Threema, Session, Wire and others — advertise full E2E encryption and metadata‑minimizing designs, and lists of “best” encrypted apps in 2025 include those names alongside Signal ^{[2] [8] [3]}.

2. Russia’s practical constraints on encrypted messaging for cross‑border chat

Moscow has actively restricted encrypted services: reporting shows Viber and Signal were banned in Russia, calls on WhatsApp and Telegram were restricted, and broader messaging functionality has been limited as the state pushes a home‑grown app that explicitly shares data with authorities and does not use E2E encryption ^{[4] [5] [6]}. That means a technically E2E app can still be effectively limited inside Russia by bans, throttling, or blocking of features ^{[6] [9]}.

3. Europe’s landscape: E2E remains standard but faces regulatory pressure

In Europe, Signal, WhatsApp and other E2E apps remain widely used and defended by their operators; WhatsApp has publicly insisted it is “private, end‑to‑end encrypted” in responses to Russian restrictions ^[6]. At the same time, proposed EU policies (the so‑called “Chat Control” debates) have raised alarms that new rules could force access to message contents or pressure providers, with Signal and other companies warning such proposals could threaten their ability to offer E2E services in the EU ^[10].

4. Practical advice for Russia–Europe conversations

If both endpoints are outside Russia or using apps not blocked inside Russia, Signal, WhatsApp and privacy‑first apps (Threema, Wire, Session) provide E2E protection for content in transit ^{[1] [2] [8] [3]}. But when one endpoint is in Russia, users must consider reachability: Signal or Viber may be inaccessible there because of government bans; WhatsApp or Telegram messaging and calling features have been restricted intermittently ^{[5] [6] [4]}. Available sources do not mention which VPNs, proxies, or technical workarounds reliably restore access in Russia.

5. Threat model: encryption vs. endpoint and metadata risks

E2E protects message content from platform servers, but it does not hide metadata (who contacted whom, when) for many services; WhatsApp, for example, still collects metadata even while encrypting message content, and other apps vary in metadata collection and hosting policies ^{[8] [2]}. Spyware and state actors can also target endpoints (phones and accounts) to read messages before they are encrypted or after they are decrypted — recent reporting notes advanced spyware and targeted campaigns against users of Signal, WhatsApp and similar apps ^[11]. Those practical risks mean E2E is necessary but not sufficient for complete privacy.

6. Competing viewpoints and implicit agendas in sources

Industry and advocacy sources emphasize E2E as the baseline for privacy ^{[3] [2]}; app vendors such as WhatsApp publicly reiterate their E2E claims when facing bans ^[6]. Russian state‑linked reporting and policy pieces push national digital sovereignty and a state‑backed app, which critics say will enable surveillance and lacks E2E ^{[4] [6]}. EU regulatory sources express law‑enforcement concerns about “going dark” and have proposed measures that some experts say would force backdoors or break E2E protections ^[10]. Each actor has clear interests: vendors defending product claims, states seeking control or security, and privacy groups opposing weakening of encryption.

Limitations and open questions

This analysis relies only on the supplied reporting; available sources do not list an exhaustive directory of every app that supports E2E between Russia and Europe, and they do not provide technical audits for every messenger’s implementations. They also do not document reliable circumvention methods when apps are blocked inside Russia. For jurisdictional or operational decisions, consult up‑to‑date technical audits and legal advice.