Fact check: After the EU Chat Control gets passed, will it scan already existing messeges?

1. Summary of the results

The EU Chat Control proposal has raised concerns about its potential impact on online privacy and security ^[1]. According to various analyses, the proposal aims to prevent the circulation of child sexual abuse material by scanning users' messages ^[1], but it does not explicitly state whether this would include scanning already existing messages ^{[2] [3]}. Some sources suggest that the proposed regulation would require tech companies to scan private messages and emails for child abuse material, which could potentially include existing messages ^[4]. However, other sources emphasize the risks associated with introducing backdoors into end-to-end encrypted services, including the potential for false positives and the exposure of sensitive information ^[5]. The proposal is still being debated, and its measures are likely to change before anything is enforced ^[1].

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

A key point missing from the original statement is the technical feasibility of scanning encrypted messaging services and the potential consequences of breaking encryption ^[6]. Additionally, the original statement does not consider the potential risks and consequences of introducing client-side scanning technologies, including the potential for false positives and the exposure of sensitive information ^[2]. Alternative viewpoints, such as the compatibility of the proposed regulation with Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, are also not considered in the original statement ^[7]. Furthermore, the original statement does not take into account the potential impact on cybersecurity and economic competitiveness ^[7]. It is also important to consider the measures that would be taken to ensure the security and privacy of EU citizens, such as the introduction of 'detection orders' which would require technology providers to detect known or new child sexual abuse material online ^[1].

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

The original statement may be misleading as it implies that the EU Chat Control will definitely scan already existing messages, when in fact, the proposal does not explicitly state this ^{[2] [3]}. This framing may benefit those who oppose the EU Chat Control proposal by exaggerating its potential impact on online privacy ^[5]. On the other hand, the original statement may also undermine the concerns of those who support the proposal by not considering the potential benefits of scanning messages for child abuse material ^[1]. The statement may also reflect a bias against the EU Chat Control proposal by not providing a balanced view of its potential impact ^{[4] [1]}. It is essential to consider multiple viewpoints and sources to get a comprehensive understanding of the issue ^{[1] [2] [3] [4] [7] [6] [5]}.