Has ProtonVPN ever been served with a gag order or national security letter?
This fact-check may be outdated. Consider refreshing it to get the most current information.
Executive summary
Proton’s public materials and reporting consistently state Proton VPN is a Swiss, no‑logs VPN and that Swiss law prevents gag orders the way U.S. national security letters do; Proton says it has no legal obligation to keep connection logs and that “gag orders are not allowed” under Swiss law [1] [2]. Available reporting and Proton’s own blog note that NSLs in the U.S. are usually secret and come with indefinite gag orders, which makes it hard or impossible for companies to disclose if they have been served [3] [4].
1. Why people ask this: U.S. NSLs, gag orders and secrecy
The worry stems from how U.S. national security letters (NSLs) work: they can compel records without a warrant, are “almost always” accompanied by indefinite gag orders, and historically have been secretive, so observers say it’s often impossible to know which companies have been served [3] [5] [6]. Industry coverage explains that gag orders typically forbid a company from informing users, which is why VPN transparency is a recurring consumer concern [7].
2. Proton’s position and legal frame: Switzerland vs. the U.S.
Proton emphasizes its Swiss jurisdiction as core to its claim it cannot be forced to log user activity and that Swiss law does not permit the kind of gag orders tied to U.S. NSLs; Proton’s site repeatedly states under Swiss law it “cannot be forced to log your online activity” and that “gag orders are not allowed” [1] [2]. Proton’s transparency report and blog repeatedly argue Swiss courts are the only legal route for binding requests and that Proton adheres to a strict no‑logs policy [2] [8].
3. Public admissions and past incidents: what the sources say
Available sources do not provide a report showing Proton VPN explicitly saying it was served with a U.S. NSL or similar gagged demand. However, reporting about ProtonMail (a sister service in the Proton ecosystem) shows Proton has at times complied with court orders and been constrained by gag orders in specific cases involving ProtonMail—accounts of that episode note a gag order prevented warning users and updating a warrant canary until the order expired [9]. That episode concerned ProtonMail and is cited as context for how gag orders can operate; Proton’s own VPN pages maintain that VPN services are treated differently under Swiss law [9] [1].
4. Transparency practices and signals VPNs use
VPNs deploy transparency reports and warrant canaries to try to alert users to legal process; industry coverage says gag orders often limit disclosure and that canaries are used to sidestep gag orders, though canaries are not foolproof because gag orders can block updates [7]. Proton publishes a transparency report and a warrant‑canary practice is discussed broadly in the sector; Proton’s materials say they receive comparatively few government demands relative to some competitors, but that NSLs’ secrecy makes definitive public accounting difficult [7] [2].
5. Two readings of the evidence — cautious consumer vs. Proton’s claim
One interpretation: Proton’s Swiss domicile and no‑logs stance mean it is structurally less exposed to U.S. NSLs and associated indefinite gag orders, and Proton’s public statements assert that legal reality [1] [2]. Alternate interpretation: because NSLs and similar national security demands are often secret and gagged, absence of public disclosure is not proof Proton has never been served; industry coverage repeatedly cautions that “it’s impossible to know for sure which companies have been served” because gag orders prevent disclosure [4] [5].
6. What’s not in the reporting
No provided source documents a confirmed, public NSL or gag order specifically naming Proton VPN being served in the United States. Proton’s historic disclosure about ProtonMail’s compelled logs and gag limitations is in the sources, but that relates to ProtonMail rather than a documented Proton VPN NSL [9]. Therefore, available sources do not mention a definitive case where Proton VPN publicly acknowledged a gagged NSL served on its VPN business.
7. Practical takeaway for users
If your chief risk is legal compulsion from U.S. authorities, Proton highlights Swiss jurisdiction and a technical/no‑logs posture as protective features [1] [2]. If you instead weigh the possibility of secret national security process, industry reporting stresses you cannot rely solely on public disclosures because gag orders and NSL secrecy routinely block transparency [3] [4]. Users should weigh Proton’s jurisdictional and technical claims against the broad reality that some legal demands remain invisible to public accounting [1] [3].
Limitations: this analysis uses only the provided materials; they do not include a definitive public record of an NSL served on Proton VPN itself, and sources explicitly note such secrecy makes absence of evidence inconclusive [4] [5].