Have law enforcement or intelligence agencies publicly reported bypassing iCloud Private Relay?

1. What the technical community is publicly saying: Private Relay can be blocked, not necessarily “broken”

Network vendors and administrators describe concrete steps to prevent Private Relay from circumventing corporate or school filtering—e.g., returning NXDOMAIN for Apple Private Relay domains or blocking Apple’s IP ranges—so that security inspection and web filters still operate (Fortinet technical note: return NXDOMAIN; community KBs show blocking techniques) ^{[1] [2]}. Firewalla, Meraki and other guidance repeat the same point: operators can disallow or block Private Relay on managed networks or instruct users to disable it for specific networks to preserve logging and auditability ^{[3] [2]}.

2. How vendors frame the issue: a privacy feature vs. network control needs

Apple designed Private Relay to split knowledge of user identity and destination so “no single party” sees both, protecting Safari traffic and DNS, but Apple’s docs and third‑party writeups acknowledge limits: it protects only Safari (and some DNS queries), while third‑party browsers and many apps bypass the feature entirely ^{[4] [5]}. That design tension is why network operators seek technical workarounds—Apple even documents network preparation steps for Private Relay—so many vendor posts treat blocking as a legitimate operational need rather than an attack on Apple’s cryptography ^{[1] [2]}.

3. Common operational blocking techniques documented in public sources

Technical guidance repeatedly mentions DNS‑level blocking (responding with NXDOMAIN for Private Relay domains) and blocking Apple’s IP ranges (e.g., 17.0.0.0/8) as practical methods to stop Private Relay from bypassing filters and inspection (Fortinet and Smoothwall community guidance cite these approaches) ^{[1] [6]}. Some home‑router and firewall vendors provide step‑by‑step help to either disable “Limit IP Address Tracking” on a given Wi‑Fi network or to outright block Private Relay so administrators keep visibility ^{[3] [6]}.

4. What's absent in these sources: government claims of deanonymization

Across the provided vendor and community reporting, I do not find statements from law enforcement or intelligence agencies claiming they can decrypt, break, or otherwise deanonymize Private Relay sessions. The available material focuses on administrative/technical blocking and network policy workarounds, not on public claims of exploitation by state actors (available sources do not mention law‑enforcement or intelligence agencies publicly reporting successful bypasses) ^{[1] [2]}.

5. Competing perspectives and implicit agendas to watch for

Network‑management vendors and enterprises have an operational agenda—preserving filtering, compliance, and audit logs—so their guidance emphasizes blocking Private Relay ^{[1] [3]}. Privacy advocates and Apple emphasize the feature’s protective intent for end users; that framing is present in help and Apple‑focused explainers that highlight Private Relay’s design limits and intended protections ^{[5] [4]}. Recognize both sides: vendors push solutions to regain control of inspection and compliance, while privacy advocates warn users about trade‑offs and limitations.

6. Practical takeaway for readers and unanswered questions

If you operate a network and need visibility for compliance or security, follow vendor guidance (DNS NXDOMAIN, block Apple relay IPs, or require users to disable Private Relay per network) — those measures are documented and commonly used ^{[1] [3]}. If your question is whether intelligence or police agencies have publicly taken credit for circumventing Private Relay’s protections, the supplied sources do not contain such claims; further reporting beyond these technical and vendor resources would be required to confirm any such law‑enforcement disclosures (available sources do not mention law‑enforcement or intelligence agencies publicly reporting successful bypasses) ^{[1] [2]}.

Limitations: this analysis uses only the provided set of vendor, community and tech‑press documents; court filings, classified agency statements, or later investigative reporting are not part of these sources and therefore not covered here (not found in current reporting) ^{[1] [2]}.