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How does Tor browser routing work to hide IP addresses?
Executive summary
Tor hides IP addresses by wrapping a user’s traffic in multiple layers of encryption and sending it through a chain of volunteer relays (entry, middle, exit), so no single relay knows both who sent the traffic and where it ends up [1] [2]. Tor also supports onion (hidden) services that never expose a host’s IP by using .onion addresses and rendezvous/introduction protocols inside the network [1] [3].
1. How Tor’s “onion routing” actually conceals an IP—layered encryption and relay chains
Tor encrypts your data multiple times on the client, then sends that multi-layered packet through a randomized sequence of relays. Each relay removes one encryption layer and forwards the packet; the first relay (entry/guard) knows your IP but not the destination, the last relay (exit) knows the destination but not your IP, and the middle relays only pass along already‑peeled traffic—so no single node can link source and destination [2] [4] [5].
2. The three-node circuit most users see—entry, middle, exit
In practice the Tor Browser builds a short circuit (commonly three nodes) from the client into the network: an entry (or guard) node, a middle relay, then an exit node that makes the final connection to the public internet. That three-hop design balances anonymity with performance and is the pattern described in multiple technical and consumer explainers [1] [6] [5].
3. Why this routing hides your IP from websites but not every threat
Because your request leaves the Tor network from the exit node, websites see the exit node’s IP rather than your home IP—this is the core privacy gain Tor provides [5] [7]. However, the coverage you gave does not claim absolute immunity: many explainers note Tor defends against network-level observers and makes traffic correlation difficult but also discuss residual risks such as traffic analysis and deanonymization techniques [2] [4]. Available sources do not mention detailed practical attack recipes beyond general traffic-correlation risk in this dataset.
4. Onion services: hiding the server’s IP too
Tor can hide a server’s location by hosting “onion services” (formerly “hidden services”). These services publish cryptographic introductions inside the Tor network and are reached by their .onion address; the rendezvous protocol and the distributed hash table let clients and services connect without revealing the server’s real IP to either party [1] [3].
5. Why multiple layers of encryption matter—and who holds keys
The client constructs the circuit and encrypts the payload with the public keys of the relays in reverse order; each relay can decrypt only its layer using its own key, which prevents relays from seeing the full route or plaintext payload (explanations of layered encryption and per-node keying appear across technical overviews and tutorials) [2] [4]. This model is repeatedly described as “wrapping like an onion” in both educational and vendor summaries [2] [8].
6. Usability and practical trade-offs: speed, complexity, and volunteer relays
Because traffic traverses multiple, volunteer-run relays worldwide and each hop processes encryption and forwarding, Tor is typically slower than direct connections or many VPNs; guides and vendor pages note slower speeds and limitations for heavy downloads [7] [5]. The network is maintained by thousands of volunteer relays, which is vital to both capacity and the distribution of trust [1].
7. Common misconceptions and what the sources do and don’t claim
A frequent overclaim is that Tor makes you “completely anonymous.” The sources describe strong protections for hiding IPs and resisting traffic analysis, but also note there are non-network ways to deanonymize users (browser fingerprinting, misconfiguration) and that correlation attacks are theoretically possible [2] [3]. The provided sources do not supply step‑by‑step examples of deanonymization attacks or legal analyses of Tor usage beyond general cautions (not found in current reporting).
8. Competing perspectives and hidden agendas in the coverage
Technical sources and encyclopedia-style summaries (Wikipedia, academic overviews) emphasize architecture and cryptographic guarantees [1] [4]. Commercial or vendor pieces (NordVPN, Avast, Kaspersky) highlight Tor’s privacy benefits while also comparing Tor to VPNs and promoting their own products or limitations—these pieces may downplay technical nuance to favor product messaging [9] [5] [7]. Educational blogs and tutorials focus on “how it works” and practical usage guidance [6] [3].
9. What to read next from the supplied set if you want deeper technical detail
For a concise technical grounding, start with the Tor overview and design notes cited in the encyclopedia entry [1]. For hands‑on or conceptual explanations of layered encryption and client-side circuit construction, see the technical tutorials and how‑to explainers [2] [8]. For context about hidden services and rendezvous points, the Tor project and academic writeups are the best match in this set [1] [10].
Limitations: this summary is based only on the provided sources and avoids claims those sources don’t make; for formal security guidance or adversary‑model specifics consult primary Tor Project documentation and security papers beyond this set (available sources do not mention those additional primary papers here).