What specific Israeli-made surveillance or forensic technologies have been contracted by ICE, and what procurement records document those deals?
Executive summary
ICE has contracted at least two Israeli-origin forensic and surveillance technologies: Paragon Solutions’ Graphite spyware under a roughly $2 million agreement and long-standing Cellebrite forensic services and tools tied to multi-million-dollar contracts; procurement notices, Federal Procurement Data System records, congressional letters and ongoing FOIA litigation are the primary documentary trails reporters and advocates cite [1] [2] [3]. Public reporting and legal filings show those contracts have been paused, reactivated, challenged in court, and heavily redacted in public procurement records, leaving gaps about operational use and scope [3] [4].
1. Paragon’s “Graphite”: what the technology is and the contract record
Reporting identifies Graphite — commercial spyware developed by Paragon Solutions — as the Israeli-origin tool ICE contracted, a system capable of remotely penetrating smartphones, extracting data from encrypted apps and covertly activating microphones, and tied to a roughly $2 million ICE contract that was signed in late 2024 and widely reported as reactivated in 2025 [5] [1] [6]. Multiple outlets cite a federal procurement notice and Federal Procurement Data System entries showing the $2 million award to Paragon’s U.S. arm or reseller; TechCrunch and The Guardian reported the contract value and the reactivation after an earlier pause under an executive order [1] [5]. Advocacy groups and journalists have flagged incidents abroad — notably an Italian campaign that targeted journalists and civil-society figures — as context for concerns about Graphite’s capabilities and misuse [6] [7].
2. Cellebrite: established forensic services and documented contracts
ICE’s relationship with Cellebrite — a digital-forensics firm with Israeli roots used to extract data from phones — is documented in procurement histories stretching back years; legal advocacy filings and reporting say ICE has contracted with Cellebrite since at least 2008 and maintains active contracts worth roughly $11 million, with procurement notices such as a 2019 Notice of Intent to Award for smartphone-hacking technology repeatedly cited [3]. Civil-rights groups have included Cellebrite in FOIA requests and lawsuits aiming to force disclosure of contracts, citing Federal Procurement Data System materials and agency contract logs referenced in their filings [3] [2].
3. Other Israeli-linked vendors and the limits of public procurement traces
Beyond Paragon and Cellebrite, reporting highlights a broader ecosystem of surveillance vendors used by ICE — Palantir and Babel Street are repeatedly named in coverage of ICE’s surveillance stack, though Palantir is a U.S. company and Babel Street’s Israeli linkage is less central in the procurement documentation cited [8] [7]. Several investigative pieces and watchdog groups emphasize that many contracts are heavily redacted or routed through U.S. resellers/parents, complicating efforts to trace “Israeli-made” provenance in procurement databases [4] [9].
4. What procurement records and oversight documents exist now
The documentary record public advocates and journalists rely on includes Federal Procurement Data System notices, agency contract announcements and “notice of intent” filings, congressional letters pressing DHS and ICE for details, and active FOIA litigation brought by groups like the Center for Constitutional Rights and Just Futures Law seeking contract and usage records tied to Paragon and Cellebrite [2] [3] [10]. Multiple outlets report a stop-work pause under an executive order on commercial spyware that was later lifted, and congressional inquiries and legal complaints reference specific contract numbers and dollar values in public procurement systems [4] [3] [5].
5. Remaining gaps, contested claims and why they matter
Despite clear reporting that ICE holds a $2 million contract for Paragon’s Graphite and multi-million deals with Cellebrite, the public record is incomplete: redactions, vendor acquisitions and the use of U.S. subsidiaries or resellers obscure precise chain-of-origin and operational use; FOIA plaintiffs explicitly seek records that ICE has withheld, which shows procurement notices exist but operational and audit details remain hidden [3] [4]. Alternative viewpoints — ICE’s stated need for forensic tools to investigate criminal networks and the companies’ insistence on lawful-use policies — are documented in reporting, but so are counterarguments about misuse abroad and civil-rights risks, which fuel ongoing legal and congressional scrutiny [3] [6].