What countermeasures and regulations exist in India to prevent or mitigate GPS spoofing at major airports?

1. Immediate rules and reporting: the 10‑minute rule and SOPs

The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has moved from an advisory to mandatory, time‑bound reporting: after a November 2023 advisory, DGCA issued a Standard Operating Procedure on 10 November 2025 requiring real‑time reporting of GPS/GNSS anomalies around IGI and mandated that pilots, ATC and technical units report incidents within 10 minutes of detection, with specific incident details to be logged ^{[3] [2] [6]}. Multiple outlets state the aim is faster situational awareness so authorities can coordinate warnings and investigations ^{[7] [8]}.

2. Operational countermeasures at airports: contingency procedures and ground‑based navigation

When spoofing was reported near Delhi, pilots were instructed to use contingency procedures and switch from GPS‑based approaches to conventional aids; authorities stress India maintains a Minimum Operating Network (MON) of ground‑based navigation and surveillance to ensure safe operations when GNSS is compromised ^{[9] [10] [11]}. The DGCA and Delhi International Airport have also expedited ILS CAT I upgrades on IGIA’s main runway to reduce dependence on satellite navigation during critical phases ^{[4] [2]}.

3. Detection and attribution: WMO and monitoring steps

The Airports Authority of India (AAI) has asked the Wireless Monitoring Organisation (WMO) to try to locate the source of interference; the government has directed WMO to mobilise assets and use approximate spoofing‑location data shared by DGCA and AAI to track origins ^{[3] [5]}. Reporting and a nationwide database of GNSS anomalies are being compiled to identify patterns and help attribution ^{[7] [12]}.

4. Broader regulatory and audit actions

The civil aviation ministry has ordered audits and probes; AAI was directed to conduct a comprehensive audit to prevent recurrences and the National Security Advisor’s office has been reported coordinating cross‑agency investigations ^{[13] [14]}. DGCA also circulated an advisory circular ANSS AC 01 and the more recent SOPs to formalise escalation and information sharing ^{[15] [1]}.

5. Technical and industry guidance: IATA/ICAO context and recommended measures

International bodies have urged a multi‑pronged approach—improved reporting, tighter controls on jamming devices, technical mitigation, rapid equipment recovery and enhanced civil‑military coordination—and India’s authorities have cited participation in global platforms to keep up with mitigation tech and methods ^{[12] [3]}. Domestic reporting rules and MON align with these recommendations by emphasising redundancy and coordination ^{[10] [11]}.

6. Limits of current measures: detection vs prevention

Available reporting, contingency protocols and monitoring improve detection, resilience and attribution capability but do not in these sources claim to eliminate spoofing at source. Coverage repeatedly notes authorities are still investigating and that WMO is being tasked to identify sources—meaning on‑aircraft deception and cross‑border deniability remain unresolved in the reporting ^{[16] [5] [17]}. Sources do not describe concrete legal penalties for individuals selling portable spoofers or a national licensing regime for RF emitters in the affected reporting (not found in current reporting).

7. Political and security overlay: hybrid warfare concerns

Security analysts and expert commentary quoted in coverage frame repeated spoofing incidents as part of a broader electronic‑warfare or grey‑zone tactic used by state or non‑state actors near borders; the government has treated incidents as both a civil‑aviation safety and national‑security issue, invoking inter‑agency response ^{[17] [12]}. This framing affects the chosen remedies—emphasis on WMO, defence coordination and audits rather than only civilian telecom rules ^{[17] [5]}.

8. What the public and airlines should expect next

Expect continued mandatory rapid reporting, expanded monitoring, ILS and other ground‑based redundancy at major airports, and intensified WMO tracing efforts while investigations proceed; media and ministry statements say operations remained safe due to contingency use, but authorities are still tracing causes and patterns ^{[10] [9] [3]}. Available sources do not mention a completed attribution nor a publicly released technical fix that blocks spoofing transmitters at source (not found in current reporting).

Limitations: this summary uses only the cited news and expert reports provided; technical details of signal‑level counter‑spoofing equipment or legislative penalties are not described in those sources and therefore are not asserted here (not found in current reporting).