Mail list website atraf
Executive summary
Atraf is a well‑known Israeli LGBT-focused platform combining a nightlife index and geo‑located dating service that operates as a website and app, primarily serving users in Israel [1] [2] [3]. The domain atraf.co.il appears in commercial traffic and analytics tools and receives generally positive legitimacy signals from automated checkers, but the platform has been the subject of major data‑breach reporting that raises real privacy concerns for its user base [4] [5] [6] [7].
1. What Atraf is and how it works
Atraf began as a Tel Aviv–centered nightlife and LGBT events index and evolved into a dating platform and mobile app that lets users find matches by location, buy tickets to events, and save personal notes about other users via features such as “Reminder,” while the service is described as geo‑located and focused on Israeli users for now [2] [1] [8].
2. The domains and traffic picture
The primary Israeli URL atraf.co.il is listed in web traffic and competitor analyses that track monthly visits and site similarity, situating it among local nightlife and dating sites in Israel and suggesting it continues to draw measurable audience attention [5] [9]. Automated reputation services like ScamAdviser have reviewed atraf.co.il and flagged positive signals such as an SSL certificate and an overall relatively high algorithmic score, while cautioning that such machines rely on observable metadata and cannot substitute for human verification [4].
3. Security incidents that shaped public perception
Atraf’s reputation was dented in October–November 2021 when reporting by Israeli and international outlets said a hacker collective called BlackShadow—or actors claiming Iran links—exploited a web‑hosting breach and published user data from Atraf and other Israeli sites; outlets reported that at least some user profiles and locations were posted online and that the leak alarmed users who could be outed by the data [6] [3] [7]. Follow‑on coverage and security analyses claimed larger dataset leaks surfaced on criminal forums and that a significant number of user records—reports vary by outlet—were circulated, prompting warnings about phishing and compromised credentials [10] [7].
4. What the leaks mean for users and list‑style usage
Published reporting documents that personal details from Atraf users were part of the breach and that the platform’s user base includes people for whom exposure could cause harm, making mailing‑list style communications or outreach using leaked lists especially dangerous; cybersecurity commentators explicitly advised password changes and caution about phishing as attackers often weaponize leaked contact data [6] [10]. Precise claims about the full scope of data held, whether mailing lists were maintained in a particular format, or how long the site retained older user data are not consistently documented in the provided sources, and therefore cannot be definitively stated here (limitation: no source).
5. Credibility, company history and competing accounts
Profiles and industry trackers place Atraf within the Israeli LGBT ecosystem and list it alongside competitors; company histories and encyclopedia entries describe it as a Tel‑Aviv based service that grew into an app, while some commercial trackers produce divergent corporate data—Tracxn for example lists a different Atraf entity and flags it as a defunct U.S. company, illustrating the risk of conflating similarly named businesses and the need to verify domain and organizational details [8] [11].
6. Practical takeaway for researchers and users
For anyone investigating a mailing list or the site’s current mailing‑list practices, the documented facts establish that atraf.co.il is a legitimate Israeli LGBT platform with active traffic profiles and a history of serious data‑security incidents; steps should include validating the exact domain, consulting web traffic tools for current metrics, and treating any contact lists tied to breached periods as compromised until proven otherwise [5] [4] [6]. Where sources do not answer a specific question—such as the current status of mailing list opt‑in procedures or retention policies—those remain open and should be verified directly with Atraf or via up‑to‑date privacy notices (limitation: no source).