Has ProtonVPN publicly disclosed any government data requests or transparency reports?

1. Proton’s formal transparency channel: a living report and warrant canary

ProtonVPN maintains a Transparency Report and Warrant Canary on its site as the canonical place for law-enforcement request disclosures, and the company explicitly says the page is updated whenever there is a notable new legal request, with the page refreshed as recently as January 6, 2026 ^[1]. Proton’s broader legal transparency statement clarifies that only requests routed through official Swiss channels count as legally binding for disclosure, reflecting the company’s Swiss jurisdictional stance and limiting the universe of requests it treats as formal legal actions ^[2].

2. What Proton actually discloses: counts, denials, and policy context

Public reporting indicates Proton has published concrete figures in its transparency materials: a mainstream technology outlet summarized ProtonVPN’s Transparency Report as showing 29 legal requests up to June 2025 — and that all 29 orders were denied — which the company uses to illustrate how its no-logs posture limits what it can turn over ^[3]. Proton’s privacy policy links users directly to the Transparency Report and the Warrant Canary for information about law enforcement requests, underlining that the company directs disclosure through those public documents rather than ad hoc statements ^[5].

3. Independent audits bolster transparency claims but are not the same as government-request detail

Multiple independent security audits — including consecutive no-logs audits cited in Proton’s materials and in technology press coverage — have been published and affirm that Proton VPN does not retain metadata or browsing activity, a fact the company presents alongside its transparency reports to contextualize why it often cannot comply with requests for connection logs ^{[4] [6] [7]}. These third-party audits strengthen the narrative that Proton’s transparency is about verification of claims, but audits do not replace or disclose the granular content of specific government requests beyond aggregated counts or denials ^{[4] [7]}.

4. Legal and jurisdictional caveats that shape what is disclosed

Proton emphasizes Swiss law as determinative: only legal requests that come through official Swiss channels are binding, and Proton says it cannot legally comply with foreign requests that aren’t supported by Swiss authorities — an explicit limitation the company notes in its transparency/legal statements and one that shapes both what it must respond to and what it reports publicly ^[2]. That jurisdictional filter helps explain why transparency reports may show denials or no data production even when companies elsewhere might publish more granular takedown or warrant details ^[2].

5. Media corroboration and the practical takeaway for readers

Security and consumer outlets repeatedly reference Proton’s published Transparency Report and Warrant Canary and cite both aggregated request statistics and the company’s denied-order counts as evidence of Proton’s public disclosure regime and operational no-logs posture ^{[3] [8] [9]}. Taken together, the public record in Proton’s own transparency pages plus independent audits and tech press coverage shows ProtonVPN has publicly disclosed legal-request information in aggregate and maintains an active transparency practice — while also being legally constrained by Swiss law and the limits of a strict no-logs policy ^{[1] [2] [4]}.

6. Limits of reporting and unanswered specifics

The available sources document that Proton publishes transparency materials and that aggregated numbers (such as the 29 denied orders to June 2025) have been disclosed, but the public materials and third-party coverage cited do not provide a searchable, line-by-line catalogue of every individual foreign or domestic request with full redactions; thus, reporting cannot confirm whether all requests are itemized in full detail beyond aggregated counts and summary statements ^{[1] [3] [5]}.