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Has ProtonVPN's warrant canary ever indicated government requests?
Executive summary
ProtonVPN publishes a Transparency Report and Warrant Canary that lists legal requests and states the company’s position that Swiss law makes a traditional warrant canary “not meaningful,” because targets of surveillance are eventually notified and can contest orders [1]. Outside articles and reviews note ProtonVPN’s canary and say it reported a foreign-country data request in January 2019 [2], but available sources do not provide a full, independently compiled chronology showing the canary explicitly “indicating” government requests beyond Proton’s own reporting [1] [2].
1. Proton’s public stance: a transparency report, not a secret canary
ProtonVPN hosts a Transparency Report & Warrant Canary that it updates when “notable new legal request[s]” arrive and explicitly explains that Swiss law requires eventual notification to targets, making the traditional silent “canary” signal less meaningful in their view [1]. Proton’s report is positioned as an active disclosure tool: the company says it cannot comply with requests for connection logs because it does not keep them, and it documents court orders it receives and how it responded [1].
2. Claims of a 2019 request: secondary reporting vs. Proton’s record
At least one VPN-review site reports that ProtonVPN’s canary notes a data request from a foreign country in January 2019 [2]. That claim is a secondary source summarizing Proton’s materials; the primary Proton page says the transparency post is updated for notable requests but the specific 2019 item is not shown in the supplied excerpts [1] [2]. Therefore, the assertion of a January 2019 foreign request is documented in reviews but the current excerpts of Proton’s own report in the provided material do not reproduce the full entry [2] [1].
3. Swiss legal context changes how canaries function
Commentary and guides note that Swiss law differs from jurisdictions where gag orders can permanently bar disclosure. Because Swiss targets are eventually notified and can challenge orders, Proton argues a warrant canary’s stealthy “stopped updates” mechanism is less meaningful there; Proton instead lists orders in its public transparency materials [1] [3]. Privacy guides have drawn the same distinction, saying Switzerland-based services typically document orders rather than rely only on a silent canary [3].
4. Independent corroboration and limits of available reporting
Outside blog posts and reviews reference Proton’s transparency statements and note instances where ProtonMail (the sister service) handled logging requests differently at times, but the supplied sources do not contain a comprehensive, independent timeline that catalogs every governmental request ProtonVPN received or that proves the canary “indicated” secret orders beyond what Proton itself reports [4] [5] [2]. In short, available sources do not mention an independent audit or third‑party verification that the canary ever functioned as a covert alert to users of sealed orders.
5. Competing perspectives and potential agendas
Reviews and privacy sites emphasize ProtonVPN’s transparency and note specific items like the alleged 2019 request [2], while Proton’s own pages emphasize legal constraints and its reporting approach [1]. Forum posts and discussion threads sometimes conflate ProtonMail’s legal history with ProtonVPN’s record—those posts reflect user concerns but are not authoritative [6]. Be aware that commercial review sites may highlight incidents that increase perceived transparency value, while Proton emphasizes Swiss legal context and its policy of documenting orders.
6. Takeaway for users evaluating the canary’s track record
If your metric is whether ProtonVPN’s canary has ever “indicated” government requests, available reporting establishes that Proton publishes legal orders in a transparency report and that third‑party summaries report at least one foreign-country request in 2019 [1] [2]. However, the supplied sources do not contain a full, independently verified chronology proving the canary was used as a covert signal for sealed orders; Proton’s public approach is to list orders given Swiss notification rules, which reduces the need for a silent canary [1] [3].
Limitations: This analysis uses only the excerpts and pages provided in your query. For a definitive, up‑to‑date timeline of ProtonVPN’s report entries, consult ProtonVPN’s live Transparency Report page and the primary entries therein [1].