When does encryption occur during the upload process from camera roll to my eyes only on Snapchat when content is moved/uploaded and how does this affect moderation

Checked on January 26, 2026
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Executive summary

Snapchat’s “My Eyes Only” is presented by the company as a passcode‑protected, encrypted folder: content moved from Memories into My Eyes Only is locked behind a user‑chosen passcode and, according to Snapchat, encrypted such that “not even us” can view it without that passcode [1] [2]. Independent reporting and forensic discussion confirm encrypted artifacts exist and raise caveats about past weaknesses in Snapchat’s broader encryption model, leaving important unanswered questions about how that encryption intersects with platform moderation [3] [4].

1. What the product pages say about when encryption happens

Snapchat’s help and privacy pages state that after a user moves Snaps and Stories from Memories into My Eyes Only, those items require the My Eyes Only passcode to be viewed and are stored in encrypted form such that Snapchat says it cannot view them without the passcode [1] [2]. User guides and product explainers repeatedly describe My Eyes Only as a passcode‑protected folder where selected content is “saved in My Eyes Only” and becomes accessible only after entering that passcode [5] [6].

2. Practical interpretation: where encryption likely sits in the flow

The consistent wording across Snapchat materials implies encryption is applied when content is moved into My Eyes Only (i.e., a local/backup copy in Memories is re‑encrypted under the My Eyes Only mechanism and then stored), not merely at initial upload to Snapchat generally; Snapchat’s documentation emphasizes entering the passcode to re‑access those items, consistent with a separate encryption layer being applied at the moment of transfer into My Eyes Only [1] [2] [5].

3. Third‑party and forensic reporting — confirmations and caveats

Forensic practitioners have found encrypted files associated with My Eyes Only in exported account data, corroborating that a distinct encryption step exists for that content [3]. At the same time, security analysts note Snapchat’s wider history of encryption shortcomings and design choices—Comparitech and security audits have critiqued Snapchat’s past use of shared keys and unequal protections across message types—which tempers absolute trust in platform claims about unreadability or key management [4] [7].

4. How this affects moderation — what can be said from available reporting

If My Eyes Only content is truly encrypted such that Snapchat cannot decrypt without the passcode, server‑side automated moderation that inspects image or video content would be blocked from reading those pixels until a user provides the passcode, meaning standard content‑scanning pipelines (as described in platform moderation architectures) could not operate on that content in its locked state; Snapchat’s own claim that it “can’t even access” My Eyes Only content supports that implication [2] [1]. However, publicly available sources provided here do not document Snapchat’s internal moderation workflows or whether metadata, thumbnails, hashes, or other auxiliary signals remain visible to moderation systems while the content is locked, so no definitive claim can be made from these sources about what moderation still occurs [2] [1] [3].

5. Alternative viewpoints and possible exceptions

Independent analyses caution that platform statements can overstate security and that encryption posture can differ between transit, server storage, and end‑to‑end models; Comparitech highlights that Snapchat’s end‑to‑end protection historically did not cover all content types and that past implementation flaws existed [4]. Some university and community posts speculate about key exchange behavior when sharing content, but those claims are not corroborated by Snapchat’s official My Eyes Only documentation provided here, and thus should be treated as speculative [8] [3].

6. What remains unknown and why it matters

The reporting assembled confirms that My Eyes Only introduces a passcode‑guarded encryption layer applied when content is moved into that folder and that Snapchat publicly claims inability to read those items [1] [2] [5]. What is not documented in these sources are the exact cryptographic key management details, whether server‑side thumbnails or hashes survive the move, and whether law‑enforcement or safety processes can access metadata tied to My Eyes Only content—gaps that are material to understanding how moderation and abuse detection function in practice and that the available sources do not resolve [3] [4].

Conclusion

The best reading of Snapchat’s documentation and supporting third‑party findings is that encryption is applied at the point content is moved into My Eyes Only and that Snapchat asserts it cannot view that content without the user’s passcode, which would limit direct content inspection by moderation systems [1] [2] [3]. Yet independent security reporting and the absence of technical key‑management disclosures leave open whether auxiliary signals survive to enable any form of automated moderation or safety review, so authoritative answers about moderation workflows require additional technical transparency from Snapchat or forensic studies that go beyond the sources available here [4] [3].

Want to dive deeper?
How does Snapchat manage encryption keys for My Eyes Only and can they be recovered by the company?
What metadata or hashes remain visible to platforms when content is stored in encrypted user vaults like My Eyes Only?
How do law‑enforcement and safety teams handle reports involving content stored behind user passcodes on social platforms?