When an image is selected on the camera roll section of Snapchat and the user selects hide and the. Move to my eyes only is that upload process completely private
Executive summary
When a photo from the phone’s camera roll is "hidden" and moved into Snapchat’s My Eyes Only, Snapchat says that content is placed into a passcode‑protected, encrypted folder and that even Snapchat cannot view those items without the user’s passcode [1] [2] [3]. That promise covers practical protections against casual snooping and device theft, but official documentation and independent explainers also supply important caveats about backups, account access, and irreversible consequences of passcode resets that mean the process is not an absolute, context‑free guarantee of secrecy [1] [4] [2].
1. What the question seeks to know — the exact action and the threat model implied
The user is asking whether selecting an image in Snapchat’s Camera Roll view, choosing “Hide” and “Move to My Eyes Only” results in a fully private upload process — in other words, whether that image ever becomes accessible to Snapchat, stored in an unprotected cloud copy, or otherwise exposed after the user hides it (this frames the issue as both a technical storage question and a security threat‑model question) [1] [5].
2. What Snapchat officially promises about My Eyes Only
Snapchat’s Help and product pages describe My Eyes Only as a passcode‑protected folder in Memories designed to “keep your Snaps safe and encrypted” and require the user’s passcode to view the contents; documentation explicitly notes that photos and videos can be moved from the Camera Roll into My Eyes Only [1] [2]. Community and support posts emphasize the company’s framing that without the My Eyes Only password “no one can view” those items — language that Snapchat uses to signal that the folder adds an extra layer beyond ordinary account login protections [3] [5].
3. How the move/upload process actually happens, per Snapchat documentation
Snapchat’s instructions show that users can move images from the device’s camera roll into Memories and then hide them into My Eyes Only; Memories are the app’s storage hub and Snapchat warns users to ensure Memories are backed up before logging out or reinstalling the app, indicating that Memories (and by extension items moved into My Eyes Only) may interact with Snapchat’s backup infrastructure under certain settings [1] [2]. Snapchat also states that it “adds Snapchat’s magic to the content saved to Memories (as well as the content in your device’s camera roll, if you’ve granted us access to it)” — an admission that saved content is subject to some server‑side processing for personalization [2].
4. Important limits, caveats and practical threat models
Snapchat’s public materials stress protection in the event of device theft or casual access: the My Eyes Only passcode is positioned as the blocker even if someone logs into the app on a stolen device [3] [2]. At the same time, Snapchat warns that if the My Eyes Only passcode is forgotten and reset, Snaps saved under the old passcode are deleted and cannot be recovered by Snapchat — a design choice that implies true encryption keys or unrecoverable protection tied to the passcode [4]. What public docs do not fully enumerate are technical audit details (exact encryption scheme, server‑side key custody, or whether pre‑move cloud copies persist in any logs), so absolute claims about impossibility of access by Snap or law enforcement are not detailed in the available materials [2] [1].
5. Bottom line — is the move completely private?
For everyday privacy threats — friends, family, someone poking through a phone, or a thief who merely gains access to a logged‑in app — moving a camera roll image to My Eyes Only provides a strong, passcode‑gated layer that Snapchat advertises as encrypted and inaccessible without the PIN [1] [3] [2]. However, the public documentation also flags backups, server‑side processing of Memories, and the irreversible passcode reset policy, which means the process cannot be declared categorically “completely private” in every adversarial scenario without further technical disclosure from Snapchat about encryption key management, server retention of pre‑move copies, or how backups are handled [2] [1] [4]. The most accurate conclusion supported by the available reporting: My Eyes Only is designed to be a robust privacy layer for moved camera‑roll images, but the absence of detailed technical disclosure in Snapchat’s public materials prevents declaring the upload/move process absolutely and universally private in all threat models [1] [2] [4].