When you select an image in camera roll section on snapchat and select hide to my eyes only what is rhat upload peocess and encryption process
Executive summary
Selecting a photo from the device Camera Roll and choosing "Move to My Eyes Only" in Snapchat first saves that image into Memories and then marks it for client-side encryption tied to a user-chosen My Eyes Only passcode; Snapchat says the company cannot view or recover those encrypted items and cannot recover the passcode if it is forgotten [1] [2] [3]. Independent forensic reporting and community findings show remnants can sometimes be recovered from local caches or device backups, and some community code analyses indicate the PIN is stored locally in an encrypted form, so the protection is strong but not absolute on compromised devices [4] [5].
1. How the image moves from Camera Roll into My Eyes Only
When a user taps "hide to My Eyes Only" on an image in the Camera Roll, Snapchat requires that the item first be saved to Memories, and that save operation is performed on the device before the item is moved into the My Eyes Only folder inside Memories [1]. Snapchat’s own help pages instruct users to save content to Memories and then move it to My Eyes Only, meaning the flow is: Camera Roll → Memories (local app cache and backup) → My Eyes Only within the app’s Memories system [1].
2. What happens during the "upload" or transfer step
The transfer into My Eyes Only is handled inside the Snapchat app and is not described by Snapchat as a separate server-side upload of unencrypted content; the move is a client-side action within Memories that places the item into a protected folder, and Snapchat warns users to back up Memories before logging out because local state matters [1]. Third‑party writeups infer that the app may synchronize encrypted Memories with Snapchat backups, but Snapchat’s documentation stresses that the My Eyes Only passcode and the encrypted status are user-controlled and that Snapchat cannot decrypt without the passcode [1] [3].
3. The encryption model Snapchat describes
Snapchat states My Eyes Only items are protected behind a passcode and that without that passcode no one — including Snapchat — can access those private Snaps, and that forgetting the passcode means Snapchat cannot recover the content [1] [2]. Independent summaries and web guides describe the system as client-side encryption: entering the passcode triggers decryption locally and the company does not hold the passcode or plaintext keys on servers [3] [2].
4. Technical limitations, forensic findings and local artifacts
Forensic practitioners have reported that My Eyes Only content can sometimes be recovered if the snaps were viewed or exist in local media caches or in device backups and forensic tools have been updated to support extracting Memories in many cases, which shows encryption is effective but local device compromise or specialized extraction tools can expose content [4]. Community code and GitHub projects claim that the My Eyes Only PIN is stored on Android devices in an app database in bcrypt-hashed form, suggesting Snapchat hashes the PIN locally rather than storing plaintext, but that finding comes from community research rather than official Snapchat documentation [5].
5. Practical takeaways and the company’s implicit boundaries
The practical consequence is that moving a Camera Roll image into My Eyes Only engages client-side, passcode-gated encryption which Snapchat frames as irreversible without the user’s passcode — a design that protects against casual access and company-side reading but relies on the device’s integrity and the secrecy of the passcode [1] [3] [2]. Sources diverge on absolute guarantees: Snapchat’s support claims non-recoverability by the company [1], while forensic and community research warns that viewed files, caches, backups, or rooted device access can undermine the protection [4] [5].