How does the encryption process work for my eyes only on Snapchat and can they moderate content being uploaded to that folder

Checked on January 19, 2026
Disclaimer: Factually can make mistakes. Please verify important information or breaking news. Learn more.

Executive summary

Snapchat’s My Eyes Only (MEO) is a passcode‑protected vault within Memories that Snapchat says encrypts stored snaps client‑side so only the user with the right code can decrypt them [1] [2]. The security model centers on a user‑chosen PIN that derives the encryption key, meaning Snapchat claims it cannot read the contents, but that also means resetting the PIN deletes MEO data and certain forensic or local‑cache recoveries remain possible under some conditions [3] [4] [5].

1. What the company says the encryption actually is

Snap’s product pages and support materials describe MEO as an encrypted, passcode‑protected folder where snaps are “safe and encrypted” and protected behind a code chosen by the user; the company frames this as client‑side protection so “even we can’t access them” without the passcode [1] [3]. Independent explainers repeat that MEO was implemented to bolster safety by encrypting content before it’s stored, and access requires the passcode or biometrics tied to it [2] [4].

2. How the passcode and key relationship is reported to work

Reporting and technical summaries indicate MEO’s security depends on a passcode‑derived key: the user’s four‑digit PIN is used to generate the key that encrypts the stored media, so losing the PIN effectively loses the decryption key and the data [4] [3]. Snapchat warns that resetting the PIN will delete the vault, and guidance across sources stresses that the encryption’s safety hinges on the secrecy and strength of that passcode [3] [4].

3. Technical limits and real‑world recovery caveats

Forensic practitioners and community posts show caveats: if MEO content exists in local application caches or was viewed and left artifacts, tools and workflows (including commercial forensic tools and methods tied to device‑level acquisition) can recover and decrypt Memories under some conditions—meaning client‑side encryption is not an absolute barrier in every scenario [5]. Community and GitHub posts also note that Snapchat stores an encrypted PIN hash locally (reported as bcrypt in an app database on Android), which may be targeted by device‑level attack tools on rooted or compromised devices [6].

4. Can Snapchat moderate or scan My Eyes Only content?

There is no source saying Snapchat routinely scans or moderates content inside a user’s MEO vault; Snapchat’s own messaging emphasizes that the folder is encrypted and inaccessible without the passcode [1] [3]. However, wider company policies and reporting note exceptions where platforms retain or access content for legal, safety or moderation reasons in other product areas, and Snap retains metadata or content when legally required—this suggests legal processes or technical exceptions could change access dynamics, but existing sources do not document routine MEO scanning [7].

5. Competing claims and hidden agendas to watch for

Commercial guides and university writeups sometimes overstate “end‑to‑end” promises or conflate different encryption models; some marketing pieces treat MEO as absolute E2EE while forensic and community posts emphasize device and cache vulnerabilities—this split reflects different incentives: Snapchat and privacy advocates highlight user protection, while forensic actors and some vendors focus on methods to recover evidence after device compromise [8] [5] [6]. Users and journalists should treat claims of absolute privacy skeptically and weigh the company’s privacy framing against documented technical caveats.

6. Bottom line and unanswered questions

MEO uses a passcode‑derived encryption scheme that Snapchat says prevents the company from reading vault contents and makes reset destructive to the stored snaps [3] [4]. Nonetheless, local device artifacts, forensic tools, and legal processes create practical exceptions to absolute secrecy, and none of the provided sources claim Snapchat performs routine content moderation inside MEO—sources do, however, document retention and moderation practices for other Snapchat products and legal exceptions, leaving open the exact boundaries of access under legal compulsion or device compromise [7] [5]. The reporting does not provide a full cryptographic spec from Snapchat, so precise algorithms and key‑derivation details beyond community reports are not available in these sources.

Want to dive deeper?
What technical papers or patents describe Snapchat’s My Eyes Only encryption and key‑derivation methods?
Under what circumstances can law enforcement compel access to encrypted data stored by Snapchat on behalf of a user?
How do mobile forensic tools recover encrypted app data from iOS and Android devices, and what defenses mitigate those recoveries?