Does Snapchat’s My Eyes Only encrypt photos differently from regular Memories and where is encryption performed?
Executive summary
Snapchat presents My Eyes Only as an extra, encrypted vault separate from regular Memories and protected by a user-chosen passcode, and the company says those snaps are inaccessible without that passcode — “not even us,” per Snapchat’s messaging [1][2][3]. Public documentation and third‑party forensic reporting together show that while My Eyes Only is treated as a distinct, encrypted layer, Snap does not publish technical details about how its encryption differs from regular Memories nor where all cryptographic operations occur, and forensic practitioners have demonstrated scenarios in which My Eyes Only content can be recovered from devices [4][5].
1. What Snapchat claims: a private, encrypted vault separate from Memories
Snapchat’s official materials describe My Eyes Only as a password‑protected folder inside Memories that keeps selected Snaps “safe and encrypted” behind a passcode the user chooses and that those items are isolated from the rest of Memories so they require a separate unlock to view [1][3][4]. Snapchat’s user‑facing support and privacy pages emphasize that without the passcode the content can’t be viewed and warn users that Snap cannot recover a forgotten My Eyes Only passcode, language that implies Snap does not hold a straightforward plaintext copy or universal decryption key [2][4].
2. What is said — and not said — about technical differences in encryption
None of Snapchat’s public pages or mainstream guides in the provided reporting disclose algorithm names, key management details, or whether keys are generated and stored exclusively on the device or derived/escrowed on servers; the documentation limits itself to product descriptions (encrypted, passcode‑protected) without low‑level cryptographic specifics [1][3][4]. Consumer guides and press stories reiterate that My Eyes Only adds a stronger, separate lock compared with standard Memories, but they rely on Snapchat’s claims rather than independent cryptographic audits [6][7][8].
3. Forensic reporting and real‑world recoveries complicate the “unviewable” narrative
Mobile forensics practitioners have reported tools and workflows that can recover My Eyes Only content from devices under certain conditions — for example, if snaps were viewed locally and remain in application caches or when using specialized extraction tools like GrayKey paired with forensic software — which indicates that encryption protections can be bypassed in some device‑compromise scenarios or when artifacts remain on disk [5]. Those forensic findings do not necessarily contradict Snapchat’s product messaging (which focuses on casual attackers and lost devices) but they do mean “encrypted and passcode‑protected” is not an absolute guarantee against recovery in adversarial settings where attackers obtain device‑level access [5].
4. Where encryption is performed: product language suggests a mix, but details are opaque
Snapchat’s support and privacy pages explain the user flow — move Snaps into My Eyes Only, enter the passcode to view — but do not specify whether encryption/decryption happens fully on the device (client‑side), on Snapchat’s servers, or through a hybrid model with server‑side backup of encrypted blobs and client‑side key control [4][1]. The absence of published cryptographic architecture means available evidence must be read cautiously: Snapchat’s statement that it can’t recover the passcode implies limited server‑side key access, while forensic recoveries from local caches point to at least some stage where decrypted frames or keys exist on the device when snaps are opened [2][5].
5. What this means for users and investigators, and the incentives shaping the story
For users, the practical takeaway from Snapchat’s marketing and support pages is that My Eyes Only provides an added, passcode‑guarded layer intended to keep content out of casual view or from someone who merely obtains account access [1][4]; independent forensic reporting, however, underscores that determined attackers or law‑enforcement tools with device access can sometimes recover content, showing the limits of app‑level protections in compromised devices [5]. Snap’s commercial interest in positioning My Eyes Only as a privacy feature colors its public claims [3], while forensic communities and law‑enforcement stakeholders pursue access for investigative purposes, creating a natural tension that the public documentation does not resolve.