When I check my IP-address using the TOR browser I would expect it to be the IP-address of the exit node. However it is a completely different IP-address. How can that be?
Executive summary
When a site reports an IP address different from the Tor Browser's shown exit node, it can mean one of several things: the browser actually used a different network path or leaked a real address (via non‑Tor requests or active scripts), the site is reporting a cached or geoIP‑mismapped address, or the method used to verify “exit node” status is wrong; the Tor exit node ordinarily is what websites see, but many practical pitfalls and detection methods make mismatches common [1] [2] [3].
1. What Tor promises — and what it does not reveal
Tor’s design routes traffic through entry, middle and exit relays so that the destination sees the exit relay’s IP rather than the client’s IP; the exit relay should not learn the original client IP because each hop only knows its immediate neighbors [2]. The Tor Project’s exit list and DNS services exist precisely because sites normally see the exit address and operators want to know which IPs belong to Tor exits [4] [5].
2. Mismatch causes: non‑Tor requests and browser leaks
A primary reason for seeing a “different” IP is that some requests from the browser are not going through the Tor circuit at all — for example, embedded resources, plugins or scripts can make direct requests, or deanonymizing scripts can run inside the page and cause the server to observe a non‑Tor address; practitioners have documented that sites sometimes use active fingerprinting or deanonymizing scripts that reveal more than a passive IP check [3]. Browsers or tools that aren’t configured to resolve hostnames through Tor (vs. resolving locally) can also leak the real DNS or IP; community Q&A notes that switching client proxy options (e.g. to --socks5-hostname) changes how the hostname resolution and exit IP behave [6].
3. Detection vs. reality: exit lists, DNS services and what they return
Tools that check whether an IP is a Tor exit rely on public lists or DNS queries maintained by the Tor Project and third parties; the Tor bulk exit list and TorDNSEL/DNS-based checks let operators determine if an IP belongs to an exit relay, and the Tor Project changed how its services report exits (returning 127.0.0.2 for matches) and now lists IPs observed in active measurements regardless of exit policy [4] [5]. If a site reports an IP that isn’t in a given exit list, it might be because the list used was stale, incomplete, or used a different detection rule [4] [5].
4. GeoIP and reporting inaccuracies
Even when the exit IP is correctly observed, the country or provider attributed to that IP by a site can be wrong because geoIP databases are imperfect; users and forums have repeatedly noted that sites sometimes report an incorrect location for an exit node, creating apparent “conflicts” between Tor Browser’s displayed exit and a website’s IP geolocation [3]. Thus a site’s “different” IP might actually be the exit but misattributed by the site’s database [3].
5. Tor client behavior and circuit choice
Tor Browser picks circuits and exit relays dynamically; users can force specific exits via torrc (ExitNodes) or use “New Identity”/“New Tor Circuit for this Site” to change exits, but Tor is designed to rotate and not guarantee one static exit — that makes transient mismatches and repeated changes more likely [7] [8] [9]. Community threads also warn that forcing a single exit can weaken anonymity and that changing circuits programmatically may still yield the same IP by chance [9] [10].
6. How to diagnose which problem it is
Verify the observed IP against the authoritative Tor exit lists or DNS check services (e.g., torbulkexitlist or TorDNSEL) to see if the IP is a known exit [4] [5]; test with a clean Tor Browser session using “New Tor Circuit for this Site” and disable page scripts to rule out active leaks [8] [3]. For advanced checks, use command‑line tools that direct hostname resolution through Tor/SOCKS (community advice references --socks5-hostname behavior) and compare results to third‑party Tor detection tools that monitor Tor addresses [6] [11]. If none of those lines up, consider geoIP misattribution as the likely explanation [3].
7. Conclusion — multiple plausible explanations, one practical approach
A reported IP that doesn’t match the Tor Browser’s exit node is not automatically evidence that Tor failed; it is often the result of non‑Tor requests, active page scripts or hostname resolution differences, stale or differing exit lists, or geoIP inaccuracies — all documented in Tor community guidance and tooling [4] [5] [3] [6]. The pragmatic path is methodical testing: confirm the IP against Tor’s exit lists, isolate whether scripts or plugins are making direct connections, and use Tor’s circuit controls or torrc only after understanding the anonymity trade‑offs [4] [8] [9].