If tor browser shows that connection is secure that means there is no way of 3rd party knowing what is being done on the webpage

1. What “secure” in the Tor Browser actually signals

When you see Tor’s padlock or HTTPS indicator, that tells you the website-to-exit-node leg is using TLS encryption (HTTPS), and Tor’s onion routing provides layered encryption across the relays so your IP is hidden from the destination server — Tor routes traffic through entry, middle and exit nodes, encrypting at each stage ^{[2] [1]}. Guides and reviews stress that Tor’s design hides your origin and that the browser defaults to HTTPS-Only mode to favor encrypted sites ^{[4] [2]}.

2. Exit nodes: the unavoidable weak point for unencrypted content

Multiple explainers warn that Tor’s protection ends at the exit node: the exit node operator sees the final, decrypted traffic when the destination connection is not HTTPS, making content visible to that node ^{[2] [1]}. Security reviews explicitly note that exit nodes “decrypt the final layer” and can therefore intercept or observe unencrypted data sent to regular (non-HTTPS) sites ^{[2] [3]}.

3. HTTPS + Tor: better but not absolute privacy

Using HTTPS inside Tor prevents exit-node operators from reading the page content, but that combination does not eliminate all risks. Security guides caution that Tor is “not 100% secure” and has limitations: browser fingerprinting, plugins, scripts, or downloads can expose identifying data; customized settings can make you easier to identify; and Tor only protects traffic that goes through the browser, not other apps on your device ^{[5] [6] [3] [1]}.

4. Browser and user-level leaks: how “secure” can mislead

Privacy blogs and how‑to guides emphasize that user behavior can defeat Tor’s protections — logging into accounts, enabling scripts, downloading files, or using plugins can reveal identity or install malware that persists beyond the Tor session ^{[6] [3] [7]}. The Tor Browser’s security slider and defaults (disable scripts at higher levels, block fonts/media) exist to reduce these risks, showing that the padlock alone is not a guarantee of anonymity ^[2].

5. Powerful adversaries and de-anonymization risks

Analyses and industry reporting underline that well-resourced adversaries or specific attacks can de-anonymize users, especially when users run outdated clients or when implementation bugs are present; the Tor Project itself urges updates and cautions about incidents involving older or unrelated apps ^{[8] [9]}. Reviews note long-standing suspicions that state actors may attempt deanonymization, and that Tor is a strong tool but not infallible ^{[5] [8]}.

6. Practical recommendations to reduce third‑party visibility

Security guides converge on practical steps: keep Tor Browser up to date, avoid logging into identifying accounts, disable or limit JavaScript and plugins, avoid downloading files over Tor, and use the browser’s higher security levels when needed ^{[6] [3] [2]}. Some sources also recommend pairing Tor with a VPN or using hardened systems like Tails/Whonix for added layers — but they warn to trust only reputable services because improper configurations can backfire ^{[7] [10]}.

7. Competing perspectives and where reporting differs

Commercial VPN and product blogs emphasize combining Tor with VPNs for broader protection and sometimes portray Tor as part of a layered stack ^{[10] [4]}. Independent explainers and Tor Project posts stress Tor’s core mission — strong anonymity for browsing — while explicitly acknowledging limitations like exit-node exposure and user-opsec errors ^{[8] [2]}. Vendors offering paid privacy services may frame Tor as improved by their products; note these sources have potential commercial incentives ^{[10] [4]}.

8. Bottom line: “secure” is necessary but not sufficient

The available sources consistently show that a Tor Browser HTTPS indicator is an important signal of encryption, but it does not mean “no third party can know what is being done.” Exit nodes, browser fingerprints, user choices, and powerful adversaries can still observe or infer activity unless you follow strict operational security and keep software current ^{[2] [1] [3]}.