What biometric data and verification methods do U.S. digital ID apps use?
Executive summary
U.S. digital ID apps combine document authentication, device-based biometrics (Face ID/Touch ID), liveness checks and cryptographic protections: Apple’s new Digital ID uses passport chip reading plus selfie and “facial and head movements” then requires Face ID or Touch ID to present the credential [1]. TSA-accepted mobile IDs and state mDL programs likewise require biometric verification (facial comparison, optional photo capture, and per-transaction biometric checks) and emphasize local verification or selective data sharing [2] [3] [4].
1. How credentials are first created: document scans, NFC chips and cryptographic checks
Issuance workflows start by proving the government ID is genuine: apps prompt users to scan the document visually or read the embedded passport/ID chip with NFC to validate the machine-readable zone and cryptographic signatures against issuing authorities [1] [5]. Industry summaries and implementations cite MRZ/NFC reads and optical checks of holograms and UV features to prevent tampering [5].
2. On-device biometrics for enrollment: selfies, liveness and motion prompts
Enrollment commonly pairs a selfie with active liveness tests — users are asked to move their head or complete facial actions to stop photo or video spoofing. Apple’s setup asks for a selfie plus “a series of facial and head movements” during creation of a Digital ID [1]. Independent reports describe integrated liveness detection that analyses depth, lighting and prompted motion to confirm presence of a live person [5].
3. Authentication to present or use the ID: platform biometrics and PINs
Once enrolled, apps rely on platform authenticators — biometric unlocks like Face ID or Touch ID or a local PIN — to ensure only the device owner can present credentials. Apple explicitly says Face ID/Touch ID protects presentations and that Digital ID data is encrypted on-device [1]. State mDLs such as Delaware’s use a six‑digit PIN plus FaceID/TouchID for contactless verification [6].
4. Biometric comparison at checkpoints: facial matching and optional photo capture
At TSA checkpoints and other use-cases, agencies use facial-comparison systems to match a live capture to the credential’s photo; TSA materials note facial comparison cameras assist verification and that photos are deleted after identity is verified, with use described as voluntary in many cases [2]. TSA’s program accepts mobile driver’s licenses and supports platform wallets and state apps for this flow [2] [3].
5. Storage models and privacy claims: local keys, encryption and “no phone‑home” goals
Vendors and platform providers emphasize storing credential data on-device, encrypting it, and minimizing central disclosure. Apple states it cannot see when or where users present their Digital ID or what data is presented [1]. NIST guidance and reporting cited in industry pieces favor user-held credentials and cryptographic verification that avoids constant server queries to reduce surveillance risk [4].
6. Alternatives and multi-factor patterns beyond biometrics
Practitioners layer biometrics with other checks: passkeys/platform authenticators mean the biometric never leaves the device and the relying party receives a signed challenge rather than a template; IDV flows often combine document checks, one‑time passcodes, direct validation against issuing-authority databases and behavioral signals to raise assurance [7] [8]. Industry guides note combining biometrics with other proofs reduces fraud and legal exposure [8] [7].
7. Technical and legal tensions: spoofing, storage law and consent regimes
Sources flag fraud risks like deepfakes and biometric injection attacks as ongoing threats, and note U.S. state laws require notice/consent or impose retention duties (for example Texas and Washington statutes cited generally in legal guidance) — prompting vendors to prefer patterns where biometric data never leaves devices [9] [7]. Biometric Update and other trade reporting emphasize the industry is racing to harden liveness and tokenization approaches as attacks evolve [9] [10].
8. What sources don’t (yet) confirm about other biometric types or centralized databases
Available sources do not mention routine use of fingerprints or iris scans in consumer mobile wallet Digital ID rollouts in the U.S.; reporting centers on facial biometrics, platform fingerprint sensors (Touch ID) and PINs [1] [6] [4]. Available sources do not describe a single nationwide centralized biometric database for wallet-based Digital IDs — instead they describe federated/state and device‑centric models and DHS/TSA program integrations [4] [3] [11].
Limitations and competing perspectives: reporting from Apple and TSA emphasizes on-device encryption, limited data sharing and deletion of checkpoint photos [1] [2]. Industry and standards discussions (NIST, state mDL examples, trade reporting) praise reduced “phone‑home” designs but also warn of evolving spoofing techniques and legislative complexity that may force different storage or consent rules [4] [9] [7]. Readers should judge vendor privacy claims against public laws and implementation details for each state or platform; exact storage, retention and secondary uses vary by product and are not exhaustively detailed in the available reporting [1] [6] [7].