What personal data is stored on Vietnam's digital ID?

1. Summary of the results

Based on the available analyses, Vietnam's digital ID system stores biometric data as its primary form of personal information, though the sources provide limited specific details about the complete data profile. The system requires facial images and fingerprints for verification purposes ^{[1] [2]}. For foreign residents specifically, the level-2 e-ID system mandates the provision of biometric data including facial images and fingerprints, which are stored and used to access various digital services ^[1].

The digital ID system, known as VNeID, operates through a mandatory facial biometric identification framework that requires either a face scan or fingerprint for account verification ^[3]. This biometric verification system has been integrated with banking services, where users' biometric data is linked directly to their bank accounts ^[3]. The implementation has been so comprehensive that Vietnam's central bank has deactivated over 86 million bank accounts due to lack of biometric information compliance ^[3].

For foreign applicants, the system requires additional documentation beyond biometric data. Foreigners must provide their passports and other valid travel documents and undergo biometric verification to apply for a digital ID ^[2]. This suggests that passport information and travel document details are also stored within the system for non-Vietnamese citizens.

The VNeID system has been designed for integration across various public services, including banking, indicating that the stored data facilitates access to multiple government and financial platforms ^[4]. The system represents part of a national push for biometric verification that encompasses facial recognition and fingerprint technologies ^[5].

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

The analyses reveal significant gaps in understanding the complete scope of personal data stored on Vietnam's digital ID. While biometric data storage is confirmed, none of the sources provide comprehensive details about other potential data categories such as:

• Personal identification information (name, date of birth, address, national ID numbers)
• Demographic data (occupation, education, family status)
• Financial information beyond the banking integration mentioned
• Digital activity logs or usage patterns
• Cross-referencing capabilities with other government databases

The sources focus heavily on the banking integration aspect and the mass account closures, but fail to address whether the digital ID stores transaction histories, spending patterns, or other financial behaviors ^[3]. This narrow focus may reflect the immediate news cycle around banking compliance rather than comprehensive system documentation.

Additionally, there's limited discussion of data retention policies, security measures, or citizen privacy protections. The analyses don't address how long biometric and personal data is stored, who has access to it, or what safeguards exist against misuse.

The international perspective is also underdeveloped. While foreign resident requirements are mentioned ^{[1] [2]}, there's no analysis of how Vietnam's system compares to digital ID implementations in other countries or international best practices for biometric data storage.

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

The original question itself doesn't contain explicit misinformation, as it's posed as an inquiry rather than a claim. However, the framing may inadvertently suggest that comprehensive information about Vietnam's digital ID data storage is readily available and transparent, when the analyses reveal this information is actually quite limited in public sources.

The sources themselves show potential bias through their selective focus on banking compliance issues rather than providing balanced coverage of the digital ID system's broader implications ^[3]. This emphasis on financial sector impacts may reflect the business-oriented nature of several sources, potentially overlooking privacy, civil liberties, or social impact perspectives.

Furthermore, the analyses lack critical examination of the government's stated purposes for data collection versus potential surveillance capabilities. The sources present the biometric requirements as administrative necessities without questioning whether the scope of data collection is proportionate to stated goals.

The absence of official government sources or technical documentation in the analyses suggests that much of the available information comes from secondary reporting, which may not capture the complete technical specifications or policy framework governing personal data storage in Vietnam's digital ID system.