What types of personal data are stored on Vietnam's digital ID cards?
Executive summary
Vietnam’s digital ID program (VNeID / Level‑based e‑IDs and chip-based citizen ID cards) stores standard biographic data plus extensive biometrics—facial images and fingerprints are explicitly collected for Level‑2 e‑IDs and chip cards, and the national population database now holds tens of millions of records (about 62–70M enrolled reported in 2025) used across healthcare, banking and public services [1] [2] [3]. Reports and government documents indicate the system is being expanded to include driver’s licenses, vehicle registration, passports and health insurance records linked to the digital ID; some sources also describe plans or proposals for broader biometric fields (iris, voice, DNA) in Project 06, though those more invasive items are reported unevenly across outlets [1] [4] [5].
1. What the IDs explicitly store: biographics plus core biometrics
Vietnam’s Level‑2 e‑ID and chip‑enabled citizen ID system collect personal identification data (name, date of birth, citizen ID number, residence document info) together with biometric identifiers—at minimum facial photos and fingerprints for Level‑2 accounts and chip cards—used to authenticate banking and public‑service transactions [1] [6] [3] [7].
2. The national databases that back the digital ID: scope and reach
The digital ID is not an isolated app; it is linked to a National Population Database and other state registries. Officials reported tens of millions of digital ID accounts issued (62M+ cited) and large‑scale biometric enrolment campaigns; Vietnam had reached roughly 70M records in the biometric national ID database by late 2024–early 2025, which is the source set being used to verify identities across services [1] [2] [8].
3. What services and documents are integrated with VNeID
VNeID is being positioned as a multi‑service “super app”: digital versions of citizen ID cards, driver’s licences, vehicle registrations, health insurance (H1 cards), passports and birth certificates are being tied into the platform. Governments and banks are using the stored data to enable or require remote authentication for tax, healthcare, social insurance and banking transactions [1] [4] [9].
4. Banking rules force biometric linkage to accounts
State Bank circulars require biometric verification for many digital banking operations; banks use the encrypted data on chip ID cards or the VNeID account to match personal information and biometric templates. Deadlines in 2025 forced large‑scale biometric registration for retail and corporate customers, and authorities cross‑checked millions of records against the national database as part of account‑validation drives [3] [10] [11] [8].
5. Reports of additional biometric fields — verified or speculative?
Some reportage on Project 06 states the project “will require the collection of complete biometric data such as facial recognition, fingerprints, iris scanning, voice recording, and DNA” for digital identity cards, but this list appears mainly in one report and is not uniformly corroborated across other sources; other pieces explicitly describe facial images and fingerprints as the operational biometrics for Level‑2 e‑IDs and chip cards [5] [6] [4]. Available sources do not uniformly confirm deployment of iris, voice, or DNA at scale.
6. Consent, sharing and third‑party use: what sources say
Officials and VNeID materials referenced in reporting say users must provide explicit consent to share personal data with third parties (for example, banks) and that consent can be revoked; at the same time, some public services and banks are being mandated to accept and rely on VNeID accounts, effectively making consent a practical prerequisite for access to many digital services [1] [9].
7. Privacy, centralisation and the potential risks flagged by reporting
Journalistic and industry pieces note that the system centralises sensitive biographic and biometric data across multiple state registries, and that this integration raises privacy and security concerns. Reports highlight possible privacy tradeoffs as the government ties health, social insurance and financial services to the same identity infrastructure [5] [4].
8. Conflicting or unclear claims you should note
There is consensus in the sources that facial images and fingerprints are collected and used; claims about broader biometric collection (iris, voice, DNA) come from fewer reports and read more like proposals or project descriptions than confirmed mass implementation [5] [6]. Likewise, counts of enrolled records vary by outlet—62M vs. ~70M—reflecting different snapshots and reporting windows [1] [2].
9. Practical implications for residents and foreigners
From July 2025 Vietnam began issuing Level‑2 e‑IDs to eligible foreign residents and making VNeID accounts a required gateway for many public and corporate services; applicants must present travel/residence documents and provide biometric data in person when required [2] [7]. Banks and digital wallets are linking access to biometrics, making enrolment a functional necessity for many online transactions [3] [10].
Limitations: This briefing relies only on the provided reporting. Where sources conflict or omit specifics—especially about iris, voice or DNA collection—claims are reported as described in those sources and not independently verified [5] [6].